A school administrator satisfies T.L.O. as to a car on the school parking lot by having reasonable suspicion. State v. Best, 201 N.J. 100, 987 A.2d 605 (2010):

A school administrator need only satisfy the lesser reasonable grounds standard rather than the probable cause standard to search a student's vehicle parked on school property.

1. In similar language, the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures and require the State to obtain a warrant prior to a search or seizure. Consistent with that standard, a warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls "within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." T.L.O. makes it clear that the protections of the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions apply to minors and students and that among the constitutional protections afforded students is the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers. Moreover, constitutional protections must be afforded by "the State itself and all of its creatures--Boards of Education not excepted." In T.L.O. the Court concluded that the school official's search was unreasonable because he lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the student was concealing evidence of illegal activity in her purse. The United States Supreme Court agreed with this Court's expression that a reasonableness standard was the appropriate legal standard, but rejected the application of that standard to the facts. (Pp. 8-15)

2. Although this Court has not previously decided whether the reasonable grounds standard or the probable cause standard should apply to a school administrator's search of a student's vehicle on school property, other jurisdictions have. Those jurisdictions have consistently applied a reasonableness standard to the search of student vehicles on school property. In the present case, the Court finds no justification to reach a different conclusion. The need for school officials to maintain safety, order, and discipline is necessary whether school officials are addressing concerns inside the school building or outside on the school parking lot. It is the school environment and the need for safety, order, and discipline that is the underpinning for the school official--who has reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses contraband--to conduct a reasonable search for such evidence. (Pp. 16-19)

3. Under the circumstances of this case, it was reasonable for the vice principal to believe that defendant may have additional contraband in all areas accessible to him on school property, including his locker and his car. Consequently, the vice principal's search of defendant's car was reasonably related in scope to the various locations on school property that defendant might have placed the contraband--on his person, his locker, and his car. (Pp. 19-21)

Four men were arrested trying to break into defendant’s property. They claimed they were looking for marijuana that they believed would be there. The police used that information to get a search warrant, and five pounds of marijuana were found. The fact they were first time CIs did not make them unreliable. [Well, every CI has to start somewhere.] State v. Jenkins, 26 So. 3d 458 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007), released for publication January 4, 2010, affirmed by Ex parte Jenkins, 26 So. 3d 464 (Ala., 2009).

Defendant was stopped for pulling out of a convenience store without headlights at 3 a.m. The officer observed a baggy of probable meth when he was talking to the defendant getting his driver’s license. The officer called for backup. The officer had probable cause for a search of the car without being able to specifically identify what was in the baggy. United States v. Garcia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8689 (D. Nev. January 5, 2010)*:

Here, at the initial point of contact with Garcia, Officer Sutton observed a clear baggy containing a crystalline substance. Based on his experience and training, he immediately identified the substance as a possible controlled substance--methamphetamine. Garcia does not dispute the presence or location of the methamphetamine, but argues that the particles were so small that it was impossible for Officer Sutton to ascertain that they were, in fact, methamphetamine. However, the inability to immediately identify the substance as methamphetamine is not dispositive. "[I]t is settled law that officers may "'draw on their own experience about cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.'" Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002))). The court finds that, a reasonable person with Officer Sutton's experience and training would have concluded, as Officer Sutton did, that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of criminal activity. Thus, under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's general warrant requirement, the police were authorized to search the vehicle. The evidence obtained as a result of the vehicle search is admissible. 7

7 The court finds separately that, standing alone, the immediately recognizable drug contraband supplied the necessary probable cause to conduct the warrantless search.

The driver in control of a vehicle has the power to consent to a search of the vehicle even if he is not the registered owner and the registered owner is present at the time. A general consent to search a vehicle extends to all objectively reasonable places in which the implied object of the search may be found, and that includes closed containers so long as no forcible destruction of property is necessary to access its contents. People v. Minor, 222 P.3d 952 (Colo. 2010).

Plaintiff’s decedent was robbing a store and had employees hostage. Through an open telephone line, the police heard threats to kill for money, and they had the place surrounded. The officers believed they saw muzzle flash inside. The robbers came out and made a run for it and were shot. Gilbert’s alleged attempt to stop and surrender was not clear enough to defeat summary judgment for excessive force in killing him fleeing from the robbery scene. Gilbert v. French, 364 Fed. Appx. 76 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Knock-and-talk entry was not shown to be without consent. Defendant’s cursory argument that a protective sweep could not occur in the face of facts showing reason to do so was insufficient. United States v. McKinney, 363 Fed. Appx. 665 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*