Defendant was suspected of paying juveniles to engage in sex with each other and him and photographing it, and other juveniles with knowledge were citizen informants. This apparently was common knowledge among a group of young people, and the police found out. The police were told that defendant used text messages on his cell phone to communicate with them. Using a court order rather than a warrant, officers obtained his text messages from Sprint, confirmed the text messages, and then got a search warrant for his house, finding the pictures. The use of a court order rather than a warrant violated the Stored Communications Act, but suppression was not the remedy. As for the search of defendant’s house, there was probable cause even without the text messages based on the detailed reports of the citizen informants. State v. Rivera, 2010 Ohio 323, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 256 (12th Dist. February 1, 2010):
[*P24] According to the record in this case, Detective Woodall obtained appellant's text message records that were less than 180 days old by using a court order rather than a warrant as required by Section 2703(a), Title 18, U.S.Code. Further, Detective Woodall did not provide notice to appellant as required by Section 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii), Title 18, U.S.Code. We find these to be violations of the Act. However, as we indicated above, Congress included several remedies for violations of the Act but did not include exclusion of as a remedy. Further, despite having the opportunity to do so, several courts have declined to hold that exclusion is a remedy for a violation of the Act. Accordingly, this court does not find it appropriate to permit exclusion as a remedy for violations of the Act. Moreover, we find it was objectively reasonable for Detective Woodall to rely on the Act being constitutional, as the Act has not been found to be unconstitutional, and Detective Woodall obtained the court order from a neutral and detached magistrate. Therefore, we find that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to the evidence obtained in violation of the Act.
[*P25] To benefit from the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment, appellant must demonstrate that he suffered a violation of a constitutional right. At best, appellant has demonstrated that he suffered a violation of a statutory right. Because appellant has not demonstrated any valid privacy interest that invokes Fourth Amendment protection and the remedy he seeks for a nonconstitutional violation is impermissible, we need not determine whether the Act is facially unconstitutional. See Cray.
[Note: If the citizen informant's information was of sufficient quality to get a search warrant for the home, and by all accounts it certainly was, if that same information was used to get the court order for the text messages, would not the court order be a de facto warrant for the text messages, and not just be called a "search warrant"? If so, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were adhered to, and the statutory violation was not sufficiently egregious to warrant suppression.]
Reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop was shown by the fact that the defendant’s apparent confederate was doing hand-to-hand drug deals and coming back to defendant’s car, giving the appearance of getting more or splitting the proceeds. “While Robinson's arguments may support a juror's reasonable doubt, the Court finds that the agents have demonstrated that a prudent person would have concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Robinson was involved in illegal activity. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, the Court finds that the agents had probable cause to believe Robinson was involved in Glenn's selling of crack cocaine to the CI.” United States v. Robinson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7392 (W.D. Ky. January 28, 2010).*
| Sun | Mon | Tue | Wed | Thu | Fri | Sat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| << < | Current | > | ||||
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
| 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
| 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
| 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 |
| 28 | ||||||
©
2003-10
Online since Feb. 24, 2003
To search Search and Seizure on Lexis.com $
Contact / About
www.johnwesleyhall.com
www.LawofCriminalDefense.com
Fourth
Amendment cases,
citations, and links [New]
Latest Slip Opinions:
U.S. Supreme Court (Home)
Federal Appellate Courts
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth
Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth
Circuit
Seventh
Circuit
Eighth
Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh
Circuit
D.C.
Circuit
Military Courts: C.A.A.F.,
Army, AF,
N-M, CG
State courts
Google Scholar
Advanced Google Scholar
Google
search tips
LexisWeb
LII State Appellate
Courts
LexisONE
free caselaw
Findlaw Free Opinions
Most recent SCOTUS
cases:
2010-11 Term:
None yet
2009-10 Term:
Michigan
v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410, decided Dec. 7 (per curiam)
(ScotusWiki)
City
of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619, 177 L. Ed. 2d 216, decided June 17 (ScotusWiki)
2008-09 Term:
Herring
v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496, decided Jan. 13 (ScotusWiki)
Pearson
v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565, decided Jan. 21 (ScotusWiki)
Arizona
v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, decided Jan. 26 (ScotusWiki)
Arizona
v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, decided April 21 (ScotusWiki)
Safford
Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354,
decided June 25 (ScotusWiki)
Research Links:
Supreme Court:
SCOTUSBlog
SCOTUSWiki
S. Ct.
Docket
Solicitor General's
site
SCOTUSreport
Briefs
online (but no amicus briefs)
Curiae (Yale
Law)
Oyez
Project (NWU)
"On the Docket"–Medill
S.Ct.
Monitor: Law.com
S.Ct.
Com't'ry: Law.com
General (many free):
LexisWeb
Google Scholar | Google
LexisOne
Legal Website Directory
Crimelynx
Lexis.com
$
Lexis.com
(criminal law/ 4th Amd) $
Findlaw.com
Findlaw.com (4th
Amd)
Westlaw.com
$
F.R.Crim.P.
41
www.fd.org
DOJ
Computer Search Manual
USSS
computer search website
ACLU on privacy
Privacy
Foundation
Electronic Privacy
Information Center
Criminal
Appeal (post-conviction) (9th Cir.)
Section 1983 Blog
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays
down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its
application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect
results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at
bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping
government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having
and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that
the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and
safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
—Pepé LePew
"There is never enough time, unless you are serving it."
—Malcolm Forbes
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)