Seventeen minutes from a traffic stop to a dog alert was not an unreasonable amount of time for the stop. Wallace v. State, 2009 WY 152, 2009 Wyo. LEXIS 170 (December 14, 2009)*:

[*P16] Here, Wallace does not dispute the validity of the initial stop and, typically, that leads us to the second prong of the analysis under Terry (i.e., were the officer's actions during the detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance). Damato, P 9, 64 P.3d at 705. However, in this case, we need not look beyond the initial stop because Wallace admits that it was lawful, and also because the record is clear that no improprieties occurred so as to violate Wallace's constitutional rights. The record shows precisely how many minutes Wallace had been detained before the drug dog alerted to drugs at the scene -- just over seventeen minutes elapsed from the time Deputy Stinson stopped the vehicle until the dog alerted. The district court was persuaded that the deputy did not drag his feet in order to allow for the canine unit to arrive. In fact, the district court concluded that the brief period of detention lasted no longer than was necessary to achieve the purpose of the stop, inasmuch as the sniff was concluded before the deputy had finished issuing the citations. We agree.

Defendant’s weaving within her own lane and touching the center line was sufficient basis for a stop. Drummer v. State, 2009 Miss. App. LEXIS 933 (December 15, 2009).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for DUI after he was found slumped behind the wheel of his vehicle after a one-vehicle accident and there was an odor of alcohol. State v. Meador, 2009 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1013 (December 11, 2009).*

Plaintiff’s claim that an order not to practice law without a license was subject to abstention. (Somehow he came up with a Fourth Amendment claim, which is indicative, perhaps, of why he's not practicing law anymore.) Feingold v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116806 (E.D. Pa. December 14, 2009).*

With search warrants for drug dealers, nexus is almost per se shown for their home for drugs and money. United States v. Huerta, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116621 (E.D. Tenn. November 10, 2009):

"In the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live," United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1998), quoting United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1991). A case that originated in this court is directly on point: United States v. Gunter, 551 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2009). Gunter argued that the affidavit filed in support of the search warrant issued by this court failed to establish a nexus between his residence and the criminal activity otherwise described in the affidavit, arguing that "the affidavit does not contain any facts indicating that Gunter was dealing drugs from his residence, and that the affidavit only mentions his residence in one short paragraph ...." 551 F.3d at 481. The Court of Appeals held that it was reasonable to conclude from the affidavit that Mr. Gunter was engaged in drug trafficking, and it was therefore reasonable to infer "that evidence of the illegal activity would be found at [his] residence," citing Gunter, supra, 551 F.3d at 481.

Accord: United States v. Huerta, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117154 (E.D. Tenn. December 3, 2009).*

Defendant’s specific argument of lack of attenuation from alleged illegal police conduct was not made in the district court, so it was waived for appeal. “While the two arguments are related, they are not the same.” United States v. Lambert, 356 Fed. Appx. 179 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished).*

Odor of marijuana coming from defendant’s vehicle was probable cause for a search. United States v. Curry, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116499 (N.D. Tex. December 14, 2009).*

Traffic stop was with a factual basis, but the officer apparently and legally abandoned it to investigate drugs. Using a drug dog within a couple of minutes of the stop was not unreasonable. United States v. Ramsey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116195 (E.D. Tenn. November 9, 2009)*:

Defendant does not dispute that only a few minutes elapsed between the stop and the alert by Red. Defendant also appears to concede the stop was not prolonged in order to deploy Red by admitting his argument does not turn on the length of the stop [Doc. 18 at 3]. That Red was deployed within a few minutes of the stop is not determinative of whether the detention was constitutional. Bell, 555 F.3d at 539. The mere two-minute lapse of time between the stop and the deployment of Red, however, certainly bolsters the undisputed video evidence that Officer Curvin had not completed all traffic enforcement acts at the time of the deployment and alert. Thus, I FIND the traffic enforcement purpose of the stop was not concluded during the time Red was deployed and almost immediately alerted, in spite of the officers' investigatory agenda. No evidence indicates Defendant was detained longer than reasonably necessary to complete the purpose of the stop or that the officers extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur. Therefore, I also FIND the officers acted with diligence and that Defendant was not detained any longer than necessary for the purpose for which he was initially pulled over -- traffic enforcement. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 2007) ("the duration of the stop was reasonable; the canine sniff was performed within a half hour of the stop"); Bell, 555 F.3d at 541 (detention proper where it is no longer than reasonably necessary for officers to complete the purpose of the stop).

Violation of state law in not getting defendant before a state magistrate was not relevant to this case where defendant was promptly charged in federal court, too. The Fourth Amendment governs, not the violation of state law. United States v. Mott, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116117 (E.D. Tenn. December 14, 2009).*

Defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in shipping containers stored on property belonging to another. The property was deeded to another, and the defendant sought to show the true financial relationship between them as to who had a mortgage and who owed what, but it did not overcome the fact that another owned the property and had control over it. The containers were left unattended, and, by all accounts, were abandoned. United States v. Swift, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116161 (D. Haw. December 14, 2009).*

The seizure in this case depends on a search incident in violation of Gant, so claimant’s judgment on the pleadings is granted. United States v. $14,448.00 United States Currency, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116184 (E.D. Mo. December 14, 2009).*

David J. Warner, A Call to Action: The Fourth Amendment, the Future of Radio Frequency Identification and Society, 40 Loy. (L.A.) L. Rev. 853 (2007). SSRN Abstract:

Nuclear materials. Barcelona club-goers. Mexican diplomats. Japanese schoolchildren. Your next pair of underwear. What do all these things have in common? All of these items either currently contain, or could soon contain, a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag inside them. In this Note, David Warner looks at the future of RFID technology and addresses the growing privacy concerns with the technology. While the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from government intrusion, most RFID privacy concerns will come from the private sector. In addition, once private information is given to a third party (e.g., your supermarket), the government can access that information without a warrant. Since the Fourth Amendment is not the proper tool to dispel privacy concerns, all parts of society--government, corporations, and citizens--have a role to play in properly integrating RFID technology into society