Defendant had standing to challenge the search of his tax preparer’s office for his tax returns because he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The warrant as to him was general. People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925 (Colo. 2009), Court’s syllabus:

The Colorado Supreme Court holds that the trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search of defendant Gutierrez's tax returns and supporting documentation, which were found in his client file police seized from his tax preparer's office. First, Gutierrez has standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to a search of his client file. A taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her tax returns and return information, even when that information is in the custody of a tax preparer. This reasonable expectation of privacy is based on federal and state laws that protect the confidentiality of tax returns and return information. Second, Gutierrez's client file was searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The affidavit supporting the warrant did not name Gutierrez or refer to him in any way and therefore failed to establish individualized probable cause to search his client file. Finally, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case because the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to search Gutierrez's file that no reasonably well-trained officer could have relied upon it. Therefore, suppression of the evidence was appropriate.

News stories: Greeley Tribune, Law Week Colorado, AP.

Electric company had right to investigate theft of electricity, and taking a cop along did not make it a law enforcement search. United States v. Sanchez-Paz, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115723 (M.D. Fla. November 24, 2009)*:

Here, law enforcement obviously knew of and acquiesced in Progress Energy's inspection of the meter at 3630 Twisted Oak Court. The inquiry then focuses on the second requirement, that is, whether in conducting the search Progress Energy was motivated by assisting law enforcement or by furthering its own legitimate interests.

Progress Energy has a legitimate business interest in ensuring that its electricity is not stolen. It has a lawful right to enter the premises of its customers to inspect and maintain its meters and make sure that its meters are not being circumvented. It would not be unusual for these inspections to take place after receipt of a tip that electricity was being stolen, whether that tip comes from an anonymous citizen or from the police. When a tip is received from the police, Progress Energy's inspector does not thereby become an agent of the police.

Here, while Detective Angulo did enter upon the property, he did so only after Farrans requested Angulo to do so and went only so far as necessary to keep Farrans and the pit bulls in sight for Farrans' safety. This limited involvement on the part of Detectives Angulo and Edmiston does not make them participants in the search, or Farrans their agent.

Confrontation rights applied to a suppression hearing, so it was error to permit co-conspirator to testify by videoconference from jail. Here, however, it was harmless because it was cumulative. Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 2009 PA Super 239, 987 A.2d 743 (2009) (Note: Not all courts agree.)

Officers investigating passengers on a train developed reasonable suspicion for claimant’s suitcase, and it was reasonable to remove it from the train for a dog sniff under the circumstances. United States v. Funds in the Amount of $ 40,000, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115487 (N.D. Ill. December 10, 2009).*

The search of defendant’s car was justified by the automobile exception and not search incident under Gant. United States v. Goldsmith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115430 (E.D. Tex. November 12, 2009).*

Fourth Amendment applied to a search of an American citizen in Thailand by ICE officers investigating defendant’s international travel for the purpose of sex with minors in violation of U.S. law. However, the warrant clause does not require an American judge issue a warrant, and the search warrant here was issued by a Thai provincial court. United States v. Stokes, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115542 (N.D. Ill. December 11, 2009):

It is a matter of first impression in this Circuit whether the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment governs searches and seizures of U.S. citizens in foreign lands. The court is not aware of any case, and Stokes presents no authority, that holds that the Warrant Clause ever applies in foreign territory. Such an extension of the warrant requirement would be, in Justice Harlan's words, "impractical and anomalous." Accordingly, the court holds that the Warrant Clause does not apply to the search of Stokes's residence in Thailand. Stokes's objections to the search based on the invalidity of the Thai warrant and the scope of the search are overruled.

Though it has not addressed the issue directly, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested that the Warrant Clause has no extraterritorial application. Writing for the Court in Verdugo, Justice Rehnquist explained that warrants issued to conduct searches abroad "would be a dead letter outside the United States." 494 U.S. at 274. Justice Kennedy elaborated:

The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants, the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it does in this country.

Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Steven's brief concurrence and Justice Blackmun's dissent also similarly suggest that the Warrant Clause does not govern overseas searches, at least where the targets of those searches are not U.S. citizens. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring)("[The Warrant Clause has no] application to searches of noncitizens' homes in foreign jurisdictions because American magistrates have no power to authorize such searches."); Id. at 297(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("l agree with the Government, however, that an American magistrate's lack of power to authorize a search abroad renders the Warrant Clause inapplicable to the search of a noncitizen's residence outside this county.") All told, seven Justices in Verdugo seemed to agree that, because United States courts lack the sovereign authority to issue warrants abroad, the procedures and requirements set forth by the Warrant Clause do not apply to foreign searches.

According to the only federal appellate court to have considered the issue, the "warrant requirement does not govern searches conducted abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. citizens need only satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness." In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 548 F.3d 276, 287 (2nd Cir. 2008). In the Terrorist Bombings case, U.S. officials wiretapped and searched the home of an American citizen living in Kenya pursuant to a Kenyan warrant that authorized a search for "stolen property." Id. at 279. The homeowner was suspected of assisting the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, not of possessing stolen property. Id. Relying on Verdugo, the Second Circuit determined that the Warrant Clause did not apply to any search of a U.S. citizen abroad by American officials. The court offered four reasons for its decision: "First, there is nothing in our history or our precedent suggesting U.S. officials must first obtain a warrant before an overseas search." Id. at 289. "Second, nothing in the history of the foreign relations of the United States would require that U.S. officials obtain warrants from foreign magistrates before conducting searches overseas or, indeed, to suppose that all other states have search and investigation rules akin to our own." Id. at 290. "Third, if U.S. judicial officers were to issue search warrants intended to have extraterritorial effect, such warrants would have dubious legal significance, if any, in a foreign nation." Id. at 290. "Fourth and finally, it is by no means clear that U.S. judicial officers could be authorized to issue warrants for overseas searches." Id.

The court finds the Second Circuit's reasoning persuasive here. The Thai court in Pattaya, not some distant American magistrate, was the sole sovereign entity with the power to authorize a search of Stokes's home.

A past due rental agreement on a car is a factor in reasonable suspicion, and the officer has no legal obligation to call the car rental company to verify the defendant’s assertion that it has been extended. Sutton v. State, 2009 WY 148, 220 P.3d 784 (2009).

Detailed information of a likely DUI from an identified citizen informer did not have to be fully corroborated. The car was seen, followed for about two blocks, and the car weaved within the lane 4-5 times. While weaving within the lane alone would not be enough, it was when coupled with the CI’s report. State v. Van Dyke, 2009 UT App 369, 223 P.3d 465, 645 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (2009).*

There was probable cause for defendant’s arrest, so his counsel could not have been ineffective for not challenging it. State v. Trujillo, 153 Wn. App. 454, 222 P.3d 129 (2009).*

Defendant’s frisk was without reasonable suspicion under the state constitution. State v. Harrington, 167 Wn. 2d 656 (2009).* Overview:

Defendant endured a progressive intrusion at the hands of the police. Before an officer's request to search, he did not ask for defendant's name or address, did not conduct a warrant check, and did not ask if defendant carried drugs. Instead, the officer initiated contact with defendant on a dark street. The officer asked questions about defendant's activities and travel that evening and found defendant's answers suspicious. A second officer arrived at the scene and stood nearby. The first officer asked defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. Then he asked to frisk, without any specific and articulable facts that would create an objectively reasonable belief that defendant was armed and dangerous. Wash. Const. art. I, § 7, could not tolerate this progressive intrusion into defendant's privacy. Because defendant's consent to the search was obtained through exploitation of a prior illegal seizure, suppression of the evidence was required.

Hot pursuit for a fleeing misdemeanant (discarding an apparent joint in public in front of officer) into his home was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Bell, 28 So. 3d 502 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2009), released for publication February 12, 2010, writ denied by State v. Bell, 2010 La. LEXIS 533 (La. Mar. 5, 2010).

Questions to the defendant amounted to a seizure because he was not free to go. The emergency aid exception argued by the state fails because there was no concern expressed by the officer for defendant’s well-being. State v. Montano, 2009 NMCA 130, 223 P.3d 376 (2009).*

Defendant as a mere possessor of a cell phone did not have standing to contest the state’s production of records from the cell phone. He did not show a connection to the cell phone. State v. Stitt, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 2252 (December 8, 2009).*

Defendant was reasonably ordered out of his car because of a window tint violation because the officer could not see through the windows. It was not unreasonable for the officer to shine his flashlight into the vehicle and see the butt of a gun that led to the seizure of the gun. State v. Hunt, 25 So. 3d 746 (La. 2009).*

Apparent hand-to-hand transaction and defendant’s flight was reasonable suspicion. State v. McMillan, 30 So. 3d 36 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2009).*

Child welfare sexual abuse investigation interrogation of child violated family’s due process rights. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2009):

We are asked to decide whether the actions of a child protective services caseworker and deputy sheriff, understandably concerned for the well-being of two young girls, exceeded the bounds of the constitution. Specifically, the girls' mother, Sarah Greene, alleges, on behalf of S.G., one of her children, that the caseworker, Bob Camreta, and deputy sheriff, James Alford, violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized and interrogated S.G. in a private office at her school for two hours without a warrant, probable cause, or parental consent. Sarah also argues that Camreta's subsequent actions, both in securing a court order removing the girls from her custody and in subjecting the girls to intrusive sexual abuse examinations outside her presence, violated the Greenes' familial rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

As this brief description makes clear, resolving the constitutional claims at issue in this case involves a delicate balancing of competing interests. On one hand, society has a compelling interest in protecting its most vulnerable members from abuse within their home. The number of child abuse allegations is staggering: In 2007, for example, state and local agencies investigated 3.2 million reports of child abuse or neglect. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES. CHILD MALTREATMENT 2007 (2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm07/chapter2.htm.

On the other hand, parents have an exceedingly strong interest in directing the upbringing of their children, as well as in protecting both themselves and their children from the embarrassment and social stigmatization attached to child abuse investigations. Of the millions of investigations conducted by state and local agencies in 2007, only about a quarter concluded that the children were indeed victims of abuse. See id. This discrepancy creates the risk that "in the name of saving children from the harm that their parents and guardians are thought to pose, states ultimately cause more harm to many more children than they ever help." Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 413, 417 (2005).

With these competing considerations in mind, we turn first to Sarah's constitutional claims. As we explain below, we hold that the investigation conducted by Camreta and Alford and the removal and examination instigated by Camreta all violated Sarah and the girls' constitutional rights. As to the investigation, however, we conclude that Camreta and Alford cannot be liable in damages because they have qualified immunity.