Search of a stash house for hostages was on exigent circumstances, so police did not have to plan in advance to get a search warrant. [“Standing” was an issue, but it did not have to be decided.] United States v. Mancinas-Flores, 588 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009):

In light of the principle that an ongoing hostage situation presents exigent circumstances, we find that the search of the stash house was reasonable. In the original phone call, the smugglers threatened to kill and rape the hostages if the ransom remained unpaid. The smugglers agreed to give family members until October 10th to pay the ransom before harming the hostages, but ICE did not locate the stash house until October 10th, and thus time was running out. Further, testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress indicated that the officers' conclusion that they did not have time to obtain a warrant once they pinpointed the location of the stash house was reasonable. Both an ICE agent and a SAU officer testified about instances in which they waited too long to enter a stash house, resulting in people being raped or killed.

Defendant argues that even if there were exigent circumstances, the government should have prepared in advance to obtain a warrant, and its failure to do so rendered the search unreasonable. He points out that between October 6, when ICE learned of the hostage situation, and October 10, when it located the stash house, ICE took no steps to prepare an application for a warrant or ensure that it could obtain a telephone warrant upon locating the stash house. However, under the circumstances presented, the government was not required to anticipate exigent circumstances and prepare in advance to obtain a warrant.

Officers had probable cause for defendant’s arrest based on observation of apparent delivery of drugs where he had five priors, too. United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009)*:

We think the police officers in this case were armed with more than a sufficient amount of information at the time of Burnside's arrest to constitute probable cause. First, the officers were aware of Burnside's five prior felony convictions for the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance. Second, the officers knew that Burnside was currently on parole from Minnesota for a drug-related offense. Third, Officer Batterham received reliable information from two different informants who claimed that Burnside was a large-scale drug dealer; furthermore, the information supplied by one of the informants buttressed and was consistent with Officer Batterham's knowledge of Burnside's alias, Shorty Bank Roll. Fourth, officers observed Burnside participating in conduct consistent with drug trafficking. Fifth, after Burnside failed to use a turn signal and officers initiated the traffic stop, Burnside drove erratically, made a hurried call on his cell phone, and appeared to make a flight attempt.

Probable cause was shown for a search warrant for defendant’s safe deposit box. Even if not it is close enough for the good faith exception to apply. United States v. Claude X, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112641 (W.D. Mo. October 14, 2009) (USMJ R&R), obj. overruled, United States v. Claude X, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112640 (W.D. Mo. December 3, 2009):

A search warrant is supported by probable cause if the supporting affidavit presents a fair probability that evidence or contraband will be found in the location to be searched. Supporting affidavits must be read in a common-sense fashion and should be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. E.g., United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmiston, 46 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 1995). Defendants complain about the inclusion of information from confidential informants, but the Court need not consider this issue because the remaining information establishes a fair probability that contraband or evidence of drug activity was stored in the safe deposit boxes. Christina insists the affidavit does not connect her to criminal activity, and both Christina and Aarika insist the affidavit does not provide any reason to believe they were storing evidence or contraband in the boxes. Even if they are correct (and, at least with respect to Christina, the Court tends to agree), they miss the point. Probable cause does not require a showing that they were responsible for any evidence or contraband in the boxes, nor does it require a showing that they were criminally culpable. The law only requires a fair probability that evidence or contraband will be found, not that any particular person placed it in the location. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009). The affidavit provided probable cause to believe Claude was using the boxes to store evidence or contraband. A fair, common-sense reading of the affidavit presents probable cause to believe:

1. Claude was engaged in drug activity.
2. Claude frequently arranged for or oversaw the drug transactions but did not always become personally involved.
3. Claude had large sums of money and no source of income.
4. The boxes were accessed with unusual frequency, particularly in light of his lack of income.
5. The boxes were sometimes accessed on multiple times in a single day, or on consecutive days.

It was reasonable for the judge issuing the warrant to conclude that Claude was -- personally or through others -- storing drugs or money in the boxes. Whether those "others" (here, Christina) knew about the illicit source of money or otherwise have culpability is irrelevant.

The defendant consented only to an entry into the apartment and not a search, but there was sufficient factual basis for a Buie protective sweep which was limited in scope. United States v. Hassock, 676 F. Supp. 2d 154 (S.D. N.Y. 2009).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived appeal of his motion to suppress. He could not have relied on Gant, which had not yet been decided. The motion to suppress, however, was sufficient to raise a Gant scope of search incident claim, but the motion to suppress fails on the merits because of defendant’s actions created reason to believe he was holding at the time of arrest. State v. Snapp, 219 P.3d 971 (Wash. App. November 9, 2009).