CNN posted an article yesterday afternoon about an effort to stop body scans at airports being virtual strip searches. Airport security bares all, or does it?:

Privacy advocates plan to call on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to suspend use of "whole-body imaging," the airport security technology that critics say performs "a virtual strip search" and produces "naked" pictures of passengers, CNN has learned.

The national campaign, which will gather signatures from organizations and relevant professionals, is set to launch this week with the hope that it will go "viral," said Lillie Coney, associate director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which plans to lead the charge.

"People need to know what's happening, with no sugar-coating and no spinning," said Coney, who is also coordinator of the Privacy Coalition, a conglomerate of 42 member organizations. She expects other groups to sign on in the push for the technology's suspension until privacy safeguards are in place.

I was traveling through security with a friend from a lawyers meeting, and one of the lines had one of these machines, and we talked about it up to the boarding pass check, and the TSA guy said I was wrong about what it would show.

My last post on backscatter technology was here in February.

Defendant was stopped because he was driving with a "Detroit Lean", but that was indicative of nothing criminal. The stop was without reasonable suspicion. The officer thought it was to divert attention from himself, but it more likely was the opposite. Crosby v. State, 970 A.2d 894 (Md. 2009).

Officers went to defendant's hotel room to do a knock and talk, and he saw them coming and tried to flush his drugs. The officers entered to get the evidence. They lacked probable cause for the entry. State v. Hoffman, 293 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2009).*

T.L.O. governs searches of cars on school parking lot, following State v. Best, 959 A.2d 243 (N.J. Super. 2008). State v. Schloegel, 2009 WI App 85, 319 Wis. 2d 741, 769 N.W.2d 130 (2009).

Evidence supported the trial court's finding of consent. Floyd v. State, 297 Ga. App. 736, 678 S.E.2d 181 (2009).*

Police received an anonymous call of a weaving car, and the stop was unwarranted because there was not corroboration of the informant. State v. Peele, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 507 (May 5, 2009):

Similarly, in this case, the anonymous caller accurately described the car's physical characteristics and location, but did not give the police any way to test the caller's credibility. The record contains no information about who the caller was, no details about what the caller had seen, and no information even as to where the caller was located. The caller did not "predict defendant's specific future action," Hughes, 353 N.C. at 208, 539 S.E.2d at 631, other than that he was driving from one stoplight to the next. Id. at 210, 539 S.E.2d at 632 (holding that confirmation that defendant was heading in general direction indicated by tipster "is simply not enough detail in an anonymous tip situation").

Moreover, Sergeant Sullivan "did not seek to establish the reliability of the assertion of illegality." Id. at 209, 539 S.E.2d at 632. He observed defendant at the stoplight and making the turn. He then followed him for no more than a tenth of a mile. During that time, he saw defendant one time "float[]" over to touch the dotted line and then move over to touch the fog line. The officer agreed that he "never saw any operation at all [of defendant's vehicle] that was consistent with careless or reckless operation of the vehicle[.]" The officer thus did not corroborate the caller's assertion of careless and reckless driving. We, therefore, do not believe that this case can be meaningfully distinguished from McArn and, consequently, the anonymous tip lacked sufficient reliability standing alone to provide reasonable suspicion for the stop.

Officers were told that defendant was communicating with a 14 year old girl, and they went to talk to him. They asked if they could look at his cell phone, and he turned it over. One officer hit the camera button and looked at the photographs on it. Defendant consented to a search of the cell phone. Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2009):

We have reviewed the record as it pertains to Appellant's giving consent. The epicenter of our inquiry is Thornhill's request to Appellant that he be allowed to examine Appellant's cellular telephone and Appellant's nonverbal response of simply handing his cellular telephone to Thornhill. There is no indication from the record that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that Appellant intended to shape the confines of his forthcoming consent by the subject matter of the conversation between him and Thornhill in the moments preceding Appellant's relinquishment of his cellular telephone to Thornhill. Instead, it is reasonable to conclude that Appellant's surrender to Thornhill of his cellular telephone in response to Thornhill's open ended request implied Appellant's grant of equally unbridled consent for Thornhill to examine the phone and the information contained therein. See, e.g., Cannon v. State, 29 F.3d 472, 477 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that defendant's answer to "go ahead" and look in car justified search of trunk). Moreover, Appellant's failure to object to Thornhill's continued search of his phone after bestowing on him such general consent to search was an indication that Thornhill's search was within the scope of Appellant's initial consent. See id.

In sum, the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant's consent to a search of his cellular telephone was unequivocal; in other words, that Appellant's expression of consent was, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, capable of only one reasonable interpretation. See Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 818; Allridge, 850 S.W.2d at 493. Having applied a deferential standard of review to the trial court's determination of historical facts, we conclude that a reasonable person could have interpreted Appellant's handing his cellular telephone to Thornhill in response to Thornhill's open ended request as an unlimited consent to examine the information contained therein. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 667. Therefore, we hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by finding that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that Thornhill's search of Appellant's cellular telephone was within the scope of Appellant's consent. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.