The search warrant for defendant's snowmobile involved in a hit-and-run was valid. It was seen from defendant's driveway during the investigation. "Defendant cannot argue that this search was illegal simply because his driveway causes a visitor to travel deeper onto his property than other driveways." State v. Mosner, 407 N.J. Super. 40, 969 A.2d 487 (2009).*

Seeing defendant remove a gun from his waist and put it in his truck was, "at a minimum, reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant unlawfully possessed a weapon." People v. Littleton, 62 A.D.3d 1267, 878 N.Y.S.2d 540 (4th Dept. 2009).*

Two trash searches were barely enough to get a search warrant for defendant's property. Considering deference given a SW, it was enough. Here, it was combined with years' old information from a CI, and that part was insufficient. Accurately describing the cars parked outside is an observation anybody could make. Flores v. State, 287 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App. — Austin 2009):

The garbage container in which Farkas found the marihuana residue was sitting in front of the suspect premises, but it was also in or beside a city street and accessible to any neighbor or passer-by. Neither appellant nor Wardell was seen placing the garbage bags in question, or any other trash, in the container, and there was no other statement of fact in the affidavit suggesting a connection between the marihuana residue found in the garbage and either appellant, Wardell, or the suspect premises. On the other hand, the fact that Farkas found marihuana residue in the trash container outside the residence at 1920 Ramona Circle on two different occasions suggests that the incriminating material had not been placed there by a neighbor or some passer-by, but that it actually came from inside the house. The situation is analogous to the "doctrine of chances," which states that unusual events are unlikely to repeat themselves inadvertently or by happenstance. See Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also 2 John Wigmore, Evidence § 302 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). This presents a very close question, but keeping in mind the deference that is due the magistrate's determination of probable cause, we conclude that the affidavit gave the magistrate a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to search the premises for marihuana.

When there is consent, there is no need for probable cause. The trial court's finding of consent is supported by the record. State v. McCambridge, 2009 Ohio 2021, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1678 (5th Dist. April 27, 2009).*

Letters in a padlocked closet were within the scope of the search warrant which included papers. The trial court erred in finding that they were not in plain view. State v. Richardson, 2009 Ohio 2020, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1681 (5th Dist. April 27, 2009).*

A search warrant is not general just because it does not describe with complete specificity what the officers might find because they are not expected to know all that they might find or where they will have to look. United States v. Rodriguez-Jimenez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37044 (E.D. Pa. April 30, 2009):

Rather than authorizing unbridled "general exploratory rummaging in [Mr. Rodriguez-Jimenez's] belongings," ... the warrants here did not vest the agents with unrestricted discretion to search for and seize whatever they wished. Instead, the attachments to the search warrants describe in detail the places to be searched and the types of documents and other items to be seized. To be sure, the law enforcement agents cannot (and are not expected to) know with precision the exact records or kinds of apparatus or instruments of crime that may be found -- or the exact nook, cranny, drawer or shelf where the sought after evidence will be. Therefore, the Court is not obliged to be hyper-technical or overly demanding in its review of the degree of specificity of descriptions of the goods to be seized or the locations to be searched, as long as the descriptions are commensurate with the circumstances. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 108, 85 S. Ct. 741, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965); .... Here, the descriptions in the search warrants for the Rodriguez-Jimenez house and mini-market were sufficiently focused to meet the requisite standards for upholding their validity.

A drive-off from a gas station without paying justified a stop by a National Park Service officer. United States v. Cheek, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Ariz. October 7, 2008, filed April 24, 2009).*

Search incident of defendant's cell phone was reasonable: "The search of Wurie's cell phone incident to his arrest was limited and reasonable. The officers, having seen the 'my house' notation on Wurie's caller identification screen, reasonably believed that the stored phone number would lead them to the location of Wurie's suspected drug stash." The court, however, has doubts about the breadth of cellphone search incident and summarizes the law. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009):

Neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has directly considered the issue of whether a search incident to arrest may include a search of a cell phone's contents, and if it does, how thorough the search might be. It seems indisputable that a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-260 (5th Cir. 2007) (defendant had a sufficient privacy interest in his cell phone's call records and text messages to challenge their search; the search of the stored text messages, however, was permissible as incident to a valid arrest). Decisions of district courts and Courts of Appeals (often analogizing cell phones to the earlier pager technology) trend heavily in favor of finding that the search incident to arrest or exigent circumstances exceptions apply to searches of the contents of cell phones. See United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277 (D. Kan. 2007) (the same exceptions apply to warrantless searches of cell phones under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act as any other warrantless search.); United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that, "if a cell phone is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data electronically stored in the device."); United States v. Valdez, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (search of defendant's phone was contemporaneous with his arrest and the officer was reasonably concerned that if he delayed, the information on the phone would be lost); United States v. Lottie, 2008 WL 150046, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 14, 2008) (warrantless search of a cell phone justified by exigent circumstances); United States v. Dennis, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007) (search of a cell phone incident to valid arrest no different from the search of any other type of evidence seized incident to arrest); United States v. Parada, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1304 (D. Kan. 2003) (phone seized incident to valid arrest; exigent circumstances justified accessing cell phone's call records because continuing incoming calls would overwrite memory and destroy evidence); Cf. United States v. Morales-Ortiz, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D.N.M. 2004) (otherwise unlawful search of cell phone's memory for names and numbers was justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine); United States v. James, 2008 WL 1925032 (E.D. Mo. April 29, 2008) ("[T]he automobile exception allows the search of the cell phone just as it allows a search of other closed containers found in vehicles.").fn9 See also United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (warrantless searches of the stored memory of two pagers justified (i) as incident to arrest and (ii) by general consent); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535-536 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (warrantless search of pager memory comparable to a search of container contents; search was not so remote in time to invalidate it as a search incident to arrest); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993) (agents reasonably activated defendant's pager to confirm its number). Cf. United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 404 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting in dicta that the retrieval of a phone number from a pager found on defendant was a valid search incident to arrest).

fn9 But see United States v. Wall, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (declining to follow Finley; exigent circumstances might justify a warrantless search of a cell phone; but declining to allow a search of arrestee's cell phone incident to arrest; likening information stored in cell phone to a sealed letter); United States v. Quintana, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. Jan 20, 2009) (officers may be justified in searching the contents of a cell phone for evidence related to the crime of arrest, but "[w]hether a cell phone may be searched incident to an arrest to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence of another crime is a different issue."); United States v. Park, 2007 WL 1521573, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007) (based on "the quantity and quality of information that can be stored" a cell phone "should not be characterized as an element of an individual's clothing or person [subject to search incident to arrest], but rather as a 'possession within an arrestee's immediate control that has fourth amendment protection at the station house.'").