Use of handcuffs must be reasonable in a detention or it converts into an arrest. Here, the officers outnumbered the defendant and safety concerns were minimal. State v. Williams, 2008 Ohio 5511, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4639 (2d Dist. October 24, 2008):

[*P19] The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Carter. Here, there were at least four officers present at the point Williams was stopped. There is no indication in the record that any other individuals were near the officers at the time. In fact, the record indicates that even the "known crack addict" had left the area. Further, the record indicates that Williams did not make any threatening gestures and did not appear to be armed or attempting to arm himself. Also, there is no indication that Williams had failed to comply with the officers' requests.

[*P20] We conclude, based upon these facts, that the officers' use of restraints was not reasonably necessary as part of a brief, investigative stop, and that officers therefore converted the Terry stop into an arrest by handcuffing Williams.

Defendant cannot argue on appeal a ground not presented to the trial court that the prosecution can respond to. State v. McKee, 2008 Ohio 5464, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4582 (2d Dist. October 17, 2008.*

Protective sweep under Buie cannot be justified where there was already an entry in violation of Payton. United States v. Montgomery, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84975 (M.D. Pa. October 22, 2008):

Nor can the subsequent search of Montgomery's apartment be justified as a protective sweep. In Maryland v. Buie, the Supreme Court held that police may conduct a protective sweep--"a quick and limited search of premises" that is "narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person might be hiding"--incident to a lawful arrest. 494 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990). Such a search is only permitted, however, "if the searching officer possessed a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officer or others." Id. at 334; Sharrar, 128 F.3d at 822-23. Here, Buie is inapplicable because the seizure was clearly unlawful--as noted above, the agents violated Payton when they seized Montgomery at his home without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances.

Defendant did not demontrate that he abandoned his rental property because the rent was unpaid. The evidence demonstrates that he did not abandon it. A computer was taken and checked by the government for child porn. As soon as he realized it was gone, he made a theft report. There was a private search of the computer, and the police exceeded that in substantial part. United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575 (M.D. Pa. 2008)*:

Here, the evidence does not support a finding of unequivocal intent by Crist to abandon the computer. Crist returned to the house on August 10, twenty six days after his rent became overdue. No eviction proceedings had begun. Nor had Crist received notice that his property would be removed. In fact, when the Sells were hired to clean out his house, Crist was in the process of "sorting through things." Tr. 54. He returned to the premises in the midst of the Sells' removal of his belongings and proceeded to search for certain items. His strong reaction to the missing computer and nearly contemporaneous filing of a police report to retrieve his missing property, demonstrate anything but a "clear and unequivocal" intent to abandon the property. From this evidence, the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Crist intended to abandon his computer.

. . .

This reasoning requires the Court to find that the Government's post-EnCase search of Crist's computer violated the Fourth Amendment. The Government's warrantless search of Crist's computer exceeded the scope of the private search because the Government was not substantially certain the computer contained only contraband. The Government only had substantial certainty that five files on Crist's computer were contraband; Crist's expectation of privacy was not extinguished as to the contents of the thousands of other files unseen by Hipple. Thus, even if the initial EnCase analysis had not violated the Fourth Amendment, the evidence found on Crist's computer must be suppressed because the further search of Crist's computer exceeded the scope of the private search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

A student accidently brought a utility knife to school that had been left in his book bag. When the school administrators later found out about it, they took him home to recover it. The parents and student sued over the search of the house, which could not be entered on alleged consent of the student. D'Allesandro v. Brumbaugh, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84914 (N.D. Ill. October 22, 2008)

However, such considerations are not pertinent in light of the unique facts in the instant action. None of the cases cited by Defendants involved a situation where the purported consenting party was a minor under the supervision and control of a government official. The undisputed record indicates that it was not Tyler that took Brumbaugh to the Residence to retrieve the Knife, but it was Brumbaugh who placed Tyler in his car and drove him to the Residence in order to retrieve the Knife, and during all this time, Tyler was "under defendant Brumbaugh's supervision and control. ..." (Ans. PSJ 5).

The informant gave information about the defendant in two calls and a face to face meeting, and he could have been subject to prosecution for false information. The police partially corroborated the informant with innocent details. The defendant got in a car and left when he saw officers. This was all reasonable suspicion for a stop. United States v. Carstarphen, 298 Fed. Appx. 151 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*

Prison cell search and seizure of UCC related materials and copyrighting names which was contraband under prison policy was not unreasonable. Edmonds v. Sobina, 296 Fed. Appx. 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished).*