Younger absention applies to a § 1983 case filed while plaintiff's criminal case is pending. Skidmore v. Henley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82180 (E.D. Ky. October 15, 2008).*

Officer saw a man on the street leaning against a car run from him as he approached. He knocked on the door of the house ran into. The trial court's findings of consent were supported by the evidence. State v. Woolridge, 996 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2008).*

The encounter with defendant was consensual, and it led to a patdown with the officer asking if he had anything on him, and he admitted to cocaine. Police were called to a gun store because a man with a warrant was trying to buy a gun, so they came to check him out. Defendant's claim of language being a barrier was something that he had to prove and did not. People v. Marujo, 192 P.3d 1003 (Colo. 2008)*:

This court has enumerated a list of factors that may demonstrate that "a reasonable, innocent person would not feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Jackson, 39 P.3d at 1184. The factors include but are not limited to:

(1) whether there is a display of authority or control over the defendant by activating the siren or any patrol car overhead lights;
(2) the number of officers present;
(3) whether the officer approaches in a non-threatening manner;
(4) whether the officer displays a weapon;
(5) whether the officer requests or demands information;
(6) whether the officer's tone of voice is conversational or whether it indicates that compliance with the request for information might be compelled;
(7) whether the officer physically touches the person of the citizen;
(8) whether an officer's show of authority or exercise of control over an individual impedes that individual's ability to terminate the encounter;
(9) the duration of the encounter; and
(10) whether the officer retains the citizen's identification or travel documents.

Id. For a police-citizen encounter to rise to the level of a seizure, the obligation to comply must be greater than the obligation an innocent citizen would normally feel to cooperate with the police. Johnson, 865 P.2d at 842-43.

Ripping out plaintiff's penis piercing during a second unnecessary strip search made jailers liable for his injury. The second strip search was unreasonable and excessive force was applied. Alvarez v. Iniguez, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82113 (C.D. Cal. September 5, 2008).*

Common sense dictates that ordinary objects, innocent in themselves, are tools of burglars. Direct proof of crime not needed, and probable cause can be inferred. United States v. Brooks, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82067 (E.D. Pa. October 15, 2008):

Defense counsel emphasizes that the items taken or seen during the arrest that did not actually represent unambiguously illegal conduct (even if Mr. Brooks's driving was illegal). However, it was not necessary that all the facts recounted in the probable cause affidavit constitute direct proof of a crime; it can be sufficient for purposes of finding probable cause to infer probable cause by "considering the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the suspect's opportunity for concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal might hide [evidence]." Jones, 994 F.2d at 1056 .... Likewise, common sense permits the acknowledgment that a limitless list of everyday "harmless" objects can, in the wrong circumstances, become handy "tools of the trade" of a criminal. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a nighttime burglar who would try to break into a dark house without some means of creating limited but focused light (to wit, a small flashlight) and some means to poke, pry, or unfasten (to wit, a screwdriver and/or knife) and to do so without his hands slipping or leaving prints (to wit, with gloves). That these tools are often used for good works does not mean they cannot be, or were not, used for the commission of a crime. The Court concludes that, looking at the "four corners" of Det. Harris's affidavit, the issuance of the search warrant in this case meets the Gates test.

"[C]ontinuing and related illegal firearm activity" showed nexus to the defendant's house. It was a logical inference, not a direct fact. United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 2008 FED App. 0378P (6th Cir. 2008):

While Williams correctly asserts that the warrant affidavit never tied the .25 and .45 caliber handguns to the Tarnow Street residence, he overlooks the Government's logical, and indeed legally correct, assertion that "it is reasonable to suppose that some criminals store evidence of their crimes in their homes, even though no criminal activity or contraband is observed there." Here, the warrant application demonstrated "continuing and related illegal firearm activity," from which the issuing judge could infer that evidence pertaining to the handguns would be found in Williams's residence.

A magistrate may infer a nexus between a suspect and his residence, depending upon "the type of crime being investigated, the nature of things to be seized, the extent of an opportunity to conceal the evidence elsewhere and the normal inferences that may be drawn as to likely hiding places." United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1985); see United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that a court "is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense," and holding that it was reasonable to infer that a suspected drug dealer would keep evidence of his crime at his residence (citation omitted)); United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was a reasonable inference that a bank robber would keep stolen currency in his residence despite the passage of more than two months between the time of the robbery and the search).