Location of search was a drug processing house, not a residence, so defendant had no standing as a guest. State v. McCoy, 2008 Ohio 4947, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4150 (9th Dist. September 29, 2008):

[*P10] It is obvious from the evidence that the house at 1114 W. 18th Street was a place for storing and trafficking drugs, and not a traditional place of residence. When asked to describe the inside of the house in question, one of the arresting police officers stated: "It appeared to be a place where they were bringing in marijuana, cocaine, [and] they were repackaging it for distribution." The nature of the house had been so converted by the lessee that it had lost its character as a residential dwelling and with it the heightened protection inherent in such property. Furthermore, McCoy presented no testimony or evidence outside of his own assertions that showed he actually had the permission required to receive protection as an "overnight guest". See Gulley at P25 ("Although social guests enjoy Fourth Amendment protection in certain instances, privacy does not attach per se upon a person's blanket assertion that [he is] a guest in another's home.").

Consenter who signed a consent form in Spanish had apparent authority to consent to search whole premises. United States v. Aragon-Ruiz, 551 F. Supp. 2d 904 (D. Minn. 2008).*

Actual renter of rental car was not present, but an authorized driver was the passenger, and he could consent to a search of the car. State v. Morgan, 2008 Ohio 4948, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 4154 (9th Dist. September 29, 2008).*

Defendant was in a high crime area at night and adjusted his waistband in a manner the officer said looked like he was checking a gun. None of the factors cited by the police was sufficient and collectively (as Arvizu requires) sufficient. United States v. Doughty, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74248 (S.D. N.Y. September 18, 2008):

But Officer Rodriguez's impression of how he looked adjusting his weapon, without more, is insufficient grounds to provide "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. He did not testify that he relied on his professional experience as a police officer or on any particular training in the police academy or subsequently to identify Defendant's movement as consistent with movement of a person carrying a gun in the waistband. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74 (in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, Court stressed importance of allowing officers to draw upon "their own experience and specialized training"). Further, there are a myriad of innocent explanations for Defendant's conduct. He could have been simply hitching up his pants or tucking in his shirt. And the fact that neither officer saw a bulge -- a telltale sign of weapons possession -- makes it less likely that his suspicion was that of an objectively reasonable police officer. Cf. United States v. Scott, 250 Fed. Appx. 534, 535 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining how a bulge or visible object underneath clothing provides reasonable suspicion); United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1979) (reasonable suspicion established where defendant had bulge on inside of his calf which he was seen "adjusting"). Thus, this factor too would not, standing alone, sufficiently elevate a reasonable officer's suspicions to the level where the officer is permitted to stop and detain the suspect for questioning.

Unkempt yard in high crime area is not an exigent circumstance for a warrantless entry. United States v. Vurgess, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74332 (S.D. Ga. September 26, 2008):

The Government also argues that the warrantless entry was justified by the exigency of the circumstances. In support of its argument, the Government cites the condition and appearance of the property, and its location in a high crime neighborhood, as creating a sufficient danger to the community to justify a warrantless entry in the home. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Fourth Amendment would be rendered a virtual nullity if government agents could perform warrantless searches based merely on the location of a home and its unkempt appearance. Assuming that the property was in a state of disrepair and located in a high crime neighborhood, the government has failed to show that this created any specific emergency that would justify abandoning the warrant requirement. 6 Such a ruling would strip a large segment of the population of their Fourth Amendment protection simply because they have the misfortune of living in a high crime area and a disdain for performing work in the yard or on their house. In regards to the warrantless entry into an individual's home, the touchstone of Fourth Amendment protection is not the aesthetic quality of the property. This would place the applicability of an important constitutional protection in the eye of the beholder and remove crucial safeguards that operate to preserve our individual liberties.