Defendant's getting upset when being questioned about what was found during a consent search is not a withdrawal of consent. Boone v. State, 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (September 23, 2008).*

Landlord could not consent to a search of a trailer rented to a person the police were looking for. The arrest warrant was used as a search warrant. Looney v. State, 293 Ga. App. 639, 667 S.E.2d 893 (2008).*

Handcuffed suspect could consent to a search of his car. Here, it was within 15 seconds. Maloy v. State, 667 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. App. 2008).*

A consent to enter during a knock and talk is not a consent to search. United States v. Ellis, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71177 (W.D. La. June 24, 2008).

DNA sample was taken from defendant under a ruse that anybody arrested for exposing himself in public needed to give a sample. It was matched to a murder. The taking of the DNA was not unreasonable. Holmes v. State, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 741 (September 22, 2008).

A consent to search by a Spanish speaking defendant was not voluntary on the totality. The officer's own testimony was the key. United States v. Vidal-Pina, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71644 (D.N.J. September 22, 2008):

The government's theory is that Vidal-Pina was calculating and deceptive and that his answers about his work demonstrate proficiency in English that corroborates the officers' testimony that he understood the contents of the consent-to-search form and the verbal request to search the truck. But this simply doesn't square with Maroney's testimony that he was prepared to let Vidal-Pina go; it doesn't square with the testimony that reveals, when taken as a whole, that Vidal-Pina initially communicated with a store employee and apparently got the gist of the pedigree information Maroney wanted, had enough business dealings in this country to describe what he does for a living, and never went any further in his communications without assistance. The inconsistencies to be found do not relate to Vidal-Pina's conduct, but rather to the witnesses, who are at some odds about how much Spanish Turbett knew, or what precise answers Vidal-Pina gave to potentially explosive questions like "[w]hat were those counterfeit bills doing in your car?"; or why someone who knew he had identification documents in his car that could clear up Maroney's dilemma knowingly remained silent about them, and then knowingly permitted police to search the truck for anything they could find in it, including contraband that he knew was there.

The right of access of the press to search warrant materials was discussed at length by the Western District of Texas at El Paso in United States v. Ketner, 566 F. Supp. 2d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2008). In this case, the court finds that protecting the informants was a greater interest and declined to unseal the search warrant materials:

This same compelling interest leads the Court to conclude that, although there may be a qualified common law right of access to these affidavits inasmuch as they are judicial records and presumptively open, it should exercise its discretion to maintain them under seal. There is no doubt that disclosure of these documents at this point would seriously interfere with an ongoing investigation. Specifically, the Court finds that disclosing these documents to public view would pose a significant risk to the life or welfare of the cooperating witnesses and defendants, and expose these same individuals to intimidation. Critical to this conclusion is that the information at issue in this investigation can be accurately described with the exact same language used by the Gunn court:

These documents describe in considerable detail the nature, scope and direction of the government's investigation and the individuals and specific projects involved. Many of the specific allegations in the documents are supported by verbatim excerpts of telephone conversations obtained through court-authorized electronic surveillance or information obtained from confidential informants or both. There is a substantial probability that the government's ongoing investigation would be severely compromised if the sealed documents were released. [Gunn, 855 F.2d at 574]

Thus, the Court finds the public's right of access to documents filed in support of search warrants should yield to such grave concerns.

Traffic stops may be based on reasonable suspicion, and dictum in Whren is just that. United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71494 n. 4(M.D. Pa. September 17, 2008):

In light of language from Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), there has been some confusion regarding whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is needed to effect a traffic stop. Compare id. at 810 (dictum) (decision to stop automobile is reasonable when police have probable cause) with Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (holding) (traffic stops require "at least" reasonable suspicion). The Third Circuit dispelled any such confusion in United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2006), when it held that reasonable suspicion--and not probable cause--is required for a "routine" traffic stop, id. at 397. As the traffic stop at issue here was not "routine," the reasonableness of its scope is more fully addressed infra.