Defendant's gun was taken during a 2004 traffic stop and test-fired with the results going into IBIS (Integrated Ballistic Identification System) under a departmental policy of testing all guns in inventory. In 2006, the gun was linked to a murder and then back to the defendant. The 2004 test of the gun was not unreasonable. Engram v. State, 2008 Ind. App. LEXIS 2035 (September 19, 2008):

Engram also argues that the results of the 2004 ballistic test should have been suppressed because the test was performed without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As noted above, the police department test-fired Engram's handgun pursuant to a department policy. That policy required test-firing on all handguns of specified calibers that are in police custody, as well as documentation of the results in a national database. The constitutionality of routine test-firing by law enforcement of firearms legitimately in its custody is a matter of first impression. From the record it appears that the routine testing of firearms in the custody of the Indianapolis Police Department (now the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department) was commonplace in 2004, and there is no indication that the policy has changed in the interim. Thus, we consider whether the routine test-firing of firearms that are legitimately in police custody violates the Fourth Amendment.

. . .

Here, Engram has not shown that he exhibited an actual expectation of privacy in the unique markings made by his handgun on bullets and casings fired from that weapon. Engram argues in his brief that he had an expectation of privacy, but he does not support that argument with citations to the record supporting that contention. As such, Engram has waived his claim that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the unique markings made by his handgun.

Further, Engram has not shown that the markings made by his firearm on bullets and casings constitutes a privacy interest that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Indeed, society has a substantial interest in maintaining a record of firearms confiscated by law enforcement incident to a valid arrest. Carrying a handgun requires a license, which is obtained only after the applicant is cleared to carry a handgun pursuant to statutory criteria. See Ind. Code §§ 35-47-2-1, -3. Given the danger of firearms when improperly used and the connection between firearms and violent crime, we cannot conclude that society is willing to recognize a privacy interest in the markings made by firearms on bullets and casings.

"Official conduct that does not 'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy' is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005). Because Engram had no subjective expectation of privacy in the unique markings made by his handgun and because society is not willing to recognize such a privacy interest, we hold that the police department's routine test-firing of weapons legitimately under its custody is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("In order to challenge the constitutionality of a search, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which is searched."). The test-firing of Engram's handgun revealed no private information but did provide an additional means to identify his weapon apart from its serial number. Engram's argument that the 2004 test-firing of his handgun violated his Fourth Amendment rights must fail.

Exclusionary rule does not apply to driver license suspension proceedings. Beller v. Rolfe, 2008 UT 68, 194 P.3d 949, 613 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (2008).*

Anonymous tipster who briefly came forward and then disappeared after defendant's arrest was no more entitled to credibility than as an anonymous informant. Baptiste v. State, 995 So. 2d 285 (Fla. September 18, 2008).*

Defendant was approached by an officer and consented to a search of his person. State v. Corbett, 758 N.W.2d 237 (Iowa App. 2008).*

Preemptive civil suit against a criminal investigation to enjoin it is barred under Younger v. Harris. The defendant was charged with a crime after the suit was brought. Bernegger v. Haney, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70740 (N.D. Miss. September 18, 2008):

Certain types of injury, such as the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered "irreparable" in the special legal sense of the term. Younger, 401 U.S. at 46. Rather, "the threat to the plaintiff's federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution." Id. "No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid." Id. (citations omitted).

Indeed, it would produce illogical and untoward results, if a criminal defendant or suspect were allowed to interfere with or halt criminal proceedings by preemptively filing a civil suit. Like Younger and the long line of cases to follow, there "does not appear from the record that [the Plaintiff has] been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164, 63 S.Ct. 877, 881, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). There are no extraordinary circumstances present in this matter which would warrant enjoining the criminal proceedings. Compare Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965).