Trial judge's 13 pages of "textbook" analysis of the facts and law were followed by an apparent tirade against defendant's perjury at the suppression hearing which led to a motion to disqualify for bias, which was granted, and delay in the proceedings. The trial judge should have just stated that he did not believe the defendant and leave it at that. The disqualification did not retroactively require a new suppression hearing. On the merits of the detention, the defendant lost on that, and it was affirmed. People v. Williams, 156 Cal. App. 4th 949, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 711 (2d Dist. 2007).

Warrant was sought for marijuana in defendant's house, but the particularity clause said "'cocaine, crack cocaine' and collateral items believed to be related to the sale of narcotics." The motion to suppress was denied by the trial court but reversed on appeal. The particularity clause was binding. Even plain view of the marijuana on the premises was rejected. State v. Browne, 104 Conn. App. 314, 933 A.2d 735 (2007):

The state argues that the allegations asserted by the affiants in the affidavit and warrant application reflected a consistent and continuous reference to marijuana such that the absence of marijuana from the particularity clause of both the warrant and application was merely a scrivener's error. This argument was addressed in the recent United States Supreme Court case of Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004). In Groh, the court held: "The fact that the application adequately described the 'things to be seized' does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988, n.5 [104 S. Ct. 3424, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737] (1984) ('[A] warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional'); see also United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1033 ([7th Cir.] 1999) ('The Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant particularly describe the things to be seized, not the papers presented to the judicial officer ... asked to issue the warrant' (emphasis in original)) [cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1162, 120 S. Ct. 1177, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1085 (2000)]. And for good reason: 'The presence of a search warrant serves a high function,' McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 [69 S. Ct. 191, 93 L. Ed. 153] (1948), and that high function is not necessarily vindicated when some other document, somewhere, says something about the objects of the search, but the contents of that document are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. We do not say that the Fourth Amendment forbids a warrant from cross-referencing other documents. Indeed, most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document accompanies the warrant. ... But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further explore the matter of incorporation." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Groh v. Ramirez, supra, 557-58. Even if the state is correct that the affidavit and allegations sufficiently describe the items to be seized so as to inform the reader that marijuana, not cocaine, is the object of the search, here, as in Groh, the affidavit did not accompany the warrant.

The state also argues that the warrant was valid because the executing officer had personal knowledge of the crime being investigated and knew that marijuana, not cocaine, was the focus of this search. "It is true that the executing officer's personal knowledge of the place to be searched may 'cure' minor, technical defects in the warrant's place description. 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure [(2d Ed. 1987) § 4.5 (a), pp. 209-10]. However, where the inadequacy arises not in the warrant's description of the place to be searched but rather in the things to be seized, the officer's personal knowledge of the crime may not cure the defect. See generally 2 W. LaFave §§ 4.5-4.6 (discussing the particularity requirement in relation to a warrant's description of the places to be searched and the things to be seized). This is so because the purpose of a warrant is not only to limit the executing officer's discretion, but to inform the person subject to the search what items the officer may seize. United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986) [cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086, 107 S. Ct. 1289, 94 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1987)]." (Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Washington v. Riley, 121 Wash. 2d 22, 28-29, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has "long held, moreover, that the purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of general searches. See [Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 94 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1987)]. A particular warrant also assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Groh v. Ramirez, supra, 540 U.S. 561.

The state argues that because it had probable cause to believe that some of the collateral items were located in the house, the police officer could seize the marijuana under the plain view doctrine. "[O]bjects not named in the warrant, but found within an officer's plain view, may be seized if the ... officers had a reasonable basis for believing that the seized evidence was reasonably related to the offense which formed the basis for the search warrant. ... This doctrine is based upon the premise that the police need not ignore incriminating evidence in plain view while they are operating within the parameters of a valid search warrant or are otherwise entitled to be in a position to view the items seized." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 347, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). The problem with this theory in this case is that the police were not lawfully on the premises of the defendant where the marijuana was found. See United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that plain view doctrine inapplicable when "the sufficiently particularized portions make up only an insignificant or tangential part of the warrant"). Moreover, the collateral items, standing alone without the illegal drug, would not support probable cause to believe a crime was committed. Accordingly, the marijuana could not be seized under the plain view doctrine.

Defendant's own motion to suppress showed he lacked guest standing, so the motion was denied. United States v. Tolley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81937 (W.D. Ky. November 2, 2007):

Tolley states only that at the time of the search, he was a lawful guest of a resident who he describes as an "acquaintance." He offers nothing to suggest that he was anything more than a casual visitor to the Madison Avenue residence. Tolley contends that he is entitled to a hearing because the nature of his relationship with the owners is a "factual one." However, he does not offer any facts which are in dispute. The United States does not disagree that Tolley was present in the residence with the consent of an acquaintance.

Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for justifiably shooting and killing plaintiff's decedent during an arrest. The scuffle started over an investigation of whether the decedent was involved in vandalizing a Coke machine, and the events spiraled out of control to a pepperspraying, dragging the officer from a moving car, and then going for the officer's gun. Wright v. Powell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82062 (M.D. Ga. November 2, 2007):

Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Wright presented a risk of danger to Powell, and possibly others, sufficient to justify the use of deadly force. Wright had shown that he was hostile and aggressive and had already made at least one attempt to gain control of Powell's gun. Powell was justified in shooting Wright as they struggled over the gun because it was objectively reasonable for Powell to be concerned that Wright would continue to fight him for the gun and might succeed in gaining control of the gun and ultimately shooting Powell or others in the area.

"Woman scorned" was a credible informant, showing probable cause. United States v. High, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82102 (W.D. Wisc. November 2, 2007):

So which is Sims? She is not an anonymous telephonic informant with an inscrutable personal agenda, nor is she a paradigmatic street informant unwillingly working off a beef. Detective Woodmansee found her to be a credible citizen conflicted by friendship but motivated by her desire to do the right thing. High tries to impeach Sims's motives by insinuating that she was trying to punish Ross-High because of their spat, but this was not Detective Woodmansee's impression at the time and on these facts it is an illogical premise. Sims's report of what Ross-High told her and why Ross-High said it was much too intricate and indirect to qualify as a fabrication intended to get even with Ross-High. As circuitous as Sims's tale may have been, it was internally consistent and logical: a jealous wife, humiliated by her footloose husband in front of others, lashes out to salve her pride and punish his transgression.FN3

3 "Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned
"Nor hell a fury like a woman scorned"

-- William Congreve, "The Mourning Bride."

Defendant left his computer open for Internet access for peer to peer access to download files, and this did not show he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer. Moreover, there was probable cause for issuance of a search warrant off those entries into the computer. United States v. Stults, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81975 (D. Neb. November 2, 2007):

In his supplemental motion to suppress, Stults argues government agents illegally searched his computer prior to the issuance of the search warrant and used such information to establish probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Stults contends Agent Cecchini conducted a warrantless search when he viewed the files from IP address 24.252.31.129 (Stults's IP address) after Agent Cecchini launched the P2P program searching for child pornography. Stults argues Agent Cecchini was able to determine the contents of Stults's computer, retrieve files from Stults's computer, and view those files at a distant location without Stults's consent. Stults asserts without such information, there would be insufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant of Stults's premises or computer files.

The application and affidavit detail the workings of a P2P network and that of Limewire which was used in this instance. The application and affidavit set forth how Agent Cecchini accessed the P2P network, noted the downloads of various files by IP address 24.252.31.129, and then downloaded those particular files from the P2P network for viewing. The P2P network is a file sharing network that belies a reasonable expectation of privacy. Absent such an expectation, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit law enforcement officers accessing the P2P network and viewing files that have been downloaded by various IP addresses. Stults's assertion that Agent Cecchini's actions amounted to a warrantless search tainting the application and affidavit is without merit.

In a qualified immunity analysis, the question is not probable cause; it is arguable probable cause, and here there was not, so qualified immunity is no protection. Defendants' argument of exigency also fails because they had three hours to procure a warrant. Barnette v. City of Phenix City, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82300 (M.D. Ala. November 6, 2007).*

Plaintiff was taken down by the officer when he refused arrest, and this was not excessive force because he was resisting. Cardinal v. Allain, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81862 (M.D. La. November 5, 2007):

Deputy Balcuns used a straight arm bar take down tactic to bring Mr. Cardinal to the ground. Such a tactic was not excessive force because Mr. Cardinal was jerking way from Deputy Balcuns to prevent Deputy Balcuns from handcuffing him. In addition, when Deputy Balcuns made a second attempt to handcuff Mr. Cardinal, Plaintiff again responded by jerking away and pushing Deputy Balcuns. It was Mr. Cardinal's conduct and intoxicated state which created the situation at issue.