An independent finding of probable cause by a magistrate that defendant is in the house is not required. Payton only requires that the officers have reason to believe that the defendant is inside. Brown v. United States, 932 A.2d 521 (D.C. App. 2007):

Appellant argues that even if Payton is applicable by extension, the Payton warrant exception requires an independent magistrate to determine that appellant is in the dwelling to be entered. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7 ("[T]he magistrate, rather than the police officer, must make the decision that probable cause exists to believe that the person or object to be seized is within a particular place."). Because an independent magistrate did not determine that there was probable cause to believe that appellant was in Ms. Powell's home, appellant argues, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

We find this argument unpersuasive. Payton mandates that officers have a "reason to believe the suspect is within." 445 U.S. at 603. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has observed, while

Probable cause . . . must always be determined by a magistrate unless exigent circumstances excuse a warrant. . . . Reasonable belief embodies the same standards of reasonableness but allows the officer, who has already been to the magistrate to secure an arrest warrant, to determine that the suspect is probably within certain premises without an additional trip to the magistrate.

United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1977) (internal citation and quotation omitted). See also United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1997). We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and other courts that a "reasonable belief standard, and not probable cause, is sufficient to allow officers to enter a residence to enforce an arrest warrant ...." Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482. See also Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) (identifying several factors that could indicate that a defendant was on the specified premises); Route, 104 F.3d at 62 n.3 (collecting cases adopting the "reasonable belief" standard from the Second, Third, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534-35 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Woods, 560 F.2d at 665); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 319 (2d Cir. 1983) (detailing the evidence officers used to conclude there was a "reasonable basis for believing" appellant was in the apartment).

In this case, two undercover police officers actually saw appellant in Powell's apartment and stood only about five feet away from him. Investigator Parker knew appellant from previous police contact. On his way from the apartment, Parker even addressed appellant by name and appellant responded. When he returned to his vehicle, Parker radioed the arrest team and mentioned appellant by name. This was sufficient evidence to provide the investigators and arrest team with a reasonable belief that appellant was in Powell's apartment.

Defendant's stop by a park ranger was not unreasonable because the ranger was unaware of which person in the car was involved in an altercation. There is no requirement for the reasonable suspicion standard that it be based on personal knowledge. Knowledge from another law enforcement officer suffices. United States v. Cuesta, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69293 (E.D. Cal. September 13, 2007).*

Police adequately corroborated informant by reviewing chat logs to determine that there might be evidence on defendant's computer. Therefore, the warrant was issued with probable cause. In addition, the independent source doctrine would apply because the FBI was conducting its own investigation, and it would have obtained a search warrant, too. United States v. Shuler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69114 (N.D. Iowa September 17, 2007):

By the time Special Agent Kitsmiller contacted Cedar Rapids law enforcement in May 2007, they had already obtained and executed the March 16, 2007, state court Search Warrant. Special Agent Kitsmiller testified at the instant Hearing that if the computers and related materials had not previously been seized by the Cedar Rapids Police Department, then he would have sought a search warrant based on the information gathered on the Bettendorf complaint. Bettendorf authorities had been provided copies of the child pornography which originated at Defendants' home, and the Court believes that there would have been probable cause to support a search warrant based on the Bettendorf information.

In summary, the Court concludes that even if the state court Search Warrant obtained by the Cedar Rapids Police Department was not supported by probable cause, the computers and related materials would have been obtained by the FBI pursuant to its independent investigation of a separate complaint. That is, the actions by the FBI in seeking a search warrant based on the Bettendorf information would be independent of any information obtained by the state court Search Warrant. Since probable cause existed for a second search warrant, independent of the information obtained in the first search warrant, the independent source doctrine applies.

An official's refusal to return property lawfully seized does not make a reasonable seizure unreasonable. Certified v. Stetler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69255 (N.D. Ill. September 14, 2007):

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the idea that a state actor's refusal to return once lawfully obtained property can amount to an unreasonable seizure (i.e, that the refusal can transform the seizure from reasonable to unreasonable). See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Soldal's 'meaningful interference with a possessory interest' definition is limited to an individual's interest in retaining his property"; "once an individual has been meaningfully dispossessed, the seizure of property is complete, and once justified by probable cause, that seizure is reasonable."). Thus, the fact that Director Creedon failed to return the Rio--in fact, turned it over to Pugi--does not give rise to a constitutional violation. In fact, given the police report, the defendants were under no obligation to investigate Mr. Kramer's claim that Certified, not Pugi, was lawfully entitled to possession of the Rio. See Reynolds, 488 F.3d at 766; Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 524.

The fact the defendant was "attentive" during the search of his car was not proof that he was in constructive possession of a gun found in the car. United States v. Bethly, 511 F. Supp. 2d 426 (D. Del. 2007):

The government relies heavily on Bethly's conduct during the search of his car, noting that he was very attentive and was watching the officers very closely. The government does not specifically argue, but seems to imply that this behavior constitutes suspicious conduct. As previously mentioned, suspicious conduct is a proper factor to consider in the constructive possession calculus. See Bellinger, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 347; Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 97. This court, however, is not willing to make the leap the government urges. That is, the court is reluctant to find that a person's attentiveness to a search of his or her vehicle alone is necessarily the behavior of someone who has hidden contraband in the vehicle, and is concerned about its discovery. This court hopes that a person would take an interest in a search of his vehicle by police. In fact, this Judge would be very attentive and watch police officers very closely if they were conducting a search of his own vehicle, and he would expect the same of his fellow citizens. The court, therefore, gives little weight to the government's argument regarding Bethly's conduct during the search of his vehicle.

Officer was on notice that the person he was seeking consent from was without apparent authority. Therefore, the purported consent is invalid. United States v. Washington, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69303 (S.D. Ohio September 19, 2007).*

Estranged wife did have apparent authority to consent to a search. United States v. Stone, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69210 (D. Conn. September 18, 2007).*

Accidentally shooting a man fleeing from an arrest when the officer thought he pulled out a Taser is unquestionably a stop with force "intentionally applied" under Brendlin. The case was remanded for further discovery on the officer's training on the use of handguns and Tasers for qualified immunity purposes. Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2007):

Having identified the relevant facts, we now turn to the question of whether these facts establish that Purnell seized Henry within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government's action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied." Brendlin v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405 (2007) (citations and internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original). Purnell unquestionably terminated Henry's freedom of movement by means of physical force when he shot him; however, he contends that because he intended to shoot Henry with the Taser, rather than the Glock, he did not terminate Henry's freedom of movement "through means intentionally applied." The district court rejected this argument, as do we.

. . .

We are not presented with a case where police stopped someone by mere happenstance, such as the passerby who is pinned when a police car slips its brake, or by the unintended consequences of an attempted seizure, such as the fleeing suspect who crashes his vehicle. Instead, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Purnell's specific intent was to stop Henry from fleeing by means of firing a weapon, and Henry was in fact stopped by the very instrumentality (i.e., the Glock) that Purnell set in motion. We recognize that Purnell did not intend to use the Glock, but we are also mindful of the Brower Court's admonition that we should not draw too fine a line in determining whether the means that terminate a person's freedom of movement is the very means that an officer intended. If, as the Court noted, a seizure would occur when a person is stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun that an officer meant to use only as a club, then we believe that a seizure surely occurred here where Purnell intended to stop Henry by firing a weapon at him and succeeded in doing so. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the district court's order finding that Purnell seized Henry. See 428 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96.