Utah holds that a state constitutional challenge, that it stresses that it would have welcomed, was waived by defense counsel's failure to develop the issue at trial and on appeal. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 164 P.3d 397, 581 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (2007):

[*P14] We would have welcomed an analysis under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; however, we find Worwood's state constitutional claim to be procedurally barred and inadequately briefed. We have repeatedly instructed counsel on the consequences of failing to properly preserve and develop a state constitutional law claim. Still, this instruction bears repeating, given the frequency with which these claims are inadequately briefed before this court.

[*P15] When interpreting state constitutional provisions that are similar or identical to those in the federal constitution, we encourage a primacy approach. Under the primacy model, "'a state court looks first to state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and precedent, and decides federal questions only when state law is not dispositive.'"

[*P16] In developing an independent body of state search and seizure law, we have held that article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution often provides greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth Amendment, despite nearly identical language. In order to further develop state constitutional law, however, claims must be properly presented to this court. In criminal cases, "'specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record'" before the issue can be heard on appeal. The issue must be "'raised to a level of consciousness'" that allows the trial court an adequate opportunity to address it. It follows, then, that perfunctorily mentioning an issue, without more, does not preserve it for appeal. Although inapplicable in this case, a court may consider an unpreserved issue when plain error is apparent or in an exceptional circumstance. Furthermore, in part on the basis of the principle that preservation requires the lower court to be cognizant of a discreet issue, we have repeatedly refrained from engaging in state constitutional law analysis unless "an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed." (footnotes omitted)

Inevitable discovery supported admission of evidence found during police entry while a search warrant was being obtained. Officers saw a "bound, motionless body" through a motel room window, and they sought a search warrant, but entered before the warrant issued. Teal v. State, 282 Ga. 319, 647 S.E.2d 15 (2007)*:

In the case before us, the information summarized above contained in the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant for the motel room had been gathered prior to the illegal entry of the GBI crime scene investigator into the room. We conclude that the State established that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, and the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct, since the investigation that took place prior to the police error or illegal conduct resulted in information that served as the basis for issuance of a search warrant. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err when it admitted the evidence.

The United States Supreme Court decided yesterday a malicious prosecution/RICO case with a Fourth and Fifth Amendment implication: Wilkie v. Robbins. The Court held 7-2 (Opinion by Souter, concurring opinion by Thomas, Ginsburg concurring in part and dissenting in part) that actions by federal employees acting within their duties are not subject to suit under Bivens or RICO. The case is interesting for civil practitioners dealing with potential immunity from Bivens actions, but it does not have broad enough Fourth Amendment implications to discuss at length. Instead, consider this quote from Willamette Law Online:

Robbins’ High Island Ranch is private property intermingled with parcels belonging to private owners and both the state and federal governments. When Robbins bought the Ranch the easement previously enjoyed by the government had not been recorded. Negotiations with Robbins to reestablish the easement broke down and he refused to re-grant it. This conflict led to numerous trespass and permit-revocation actions cited in this suit. Robbins brought suit both under the RICO Act and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as applied in the Bivens case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming’s dismissal of the charges and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court held that aggressive practices from Bureau of Land Management employees were within their job descriptions for the most part and allowing a Constitutional tort claim against those employees under Bivens would do more harm than good. The proper remedy to overzealous government employees is legislative not judicial. [Summarized by Melissa Parker]