The defendant sought the officer's confidential personnel file for the purposes of a Pitchess to challenge the officer's credibility, but he could not make a sufficient showing to get it since the undisputed facts showed probable cause for arrest. Giovanni B. v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. App. 4th 312, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 469 (4th Dist. 2007):

To show good cause for discovery of confidential officer information, a Pitchess motion must (among other things) explain the proposed defense and articulate how the requested discovery may be admissible as direct or impeachment evidence in support of the proposed defense. (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal. 4th at p. 1024.) Here, Giovanni explained the proposed defense, and the relevance of the requested information, was a potential suppression motion that would assert "Trampus and Murgia wrote false information in their police report to justify their detention and pat[-]down of Giovanni [and] [w]ithout the false information, the officers [would] not have been justified in detaining and patting down Giovanni."

However, Giovanni was detained and placed into temporary custody based in part on his appearing to be underage and on the streets after midnight. Because the officers had (and Giovanni does not contest) this objectively reasonable basis on which to detain and place Giovanni in temporary custody for suspected violation of Chula Vista's curfew ordinance (see In re Charles C. (1999) 76 Cal. App. 4th 420, 424 [police may place minor in custody for violating curfew]; In re Ian C., supra, 87 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 859-860 [police may place minor in temporary custody for violating curfew and conduct search incident to arrest]), Giovanni cannot contest the validity of the stop and search by asserting the officers' other observations concerning suspected criminal activity were false and a subterfuge to support the stop. (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 679-681.) Giovanni's Pitchess motion did not claim it might reveal information calling into question the accuracy of the officers' observations that Giovanni was a minor on the streets in violation of curfew, or any information suggesting the officers improperly relied on their observations of his youthful appearance to support the stop. (See In re James D. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 903, 916-917.) Giovanni's Pitchess motion did not articulate how the officers' veracity would be admissible on whether, after Giovanni was properly stopped and placed in temporary custody for curfew violation, the officers were permitted to conduct the pat-down search that revealed the screwdriver.

Consent to search was voluntary on totality. The fact that the officer had his gun drawn for just 10 seconds and reholstered when any apparent threat was nonexistent was significant. So was his prior criminal history. United States v. Mendoza, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44647 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2007):

The length of time of the encounter between defendant and the officers at the time of the consent to search defendant's person was less than five minutes, and the questioning of defendant was not prolonged or repeated. Defendant exhibited a calm demeanor and was cooperative with the officers. Defendant did not exhibit any mental or physical handicaps that would effect his ability to consent to the search of his person and defendant's age was not such that it would effect his ability to consent to the search of his person. Finally, defendant's background includes a prior arrest and conviction on drug charges.

911 call from a six year old child justified officers' warrantless entry into plaintiff's home, and they were entitled to qualified immunity. Morton v. Lunde, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44523 (D. Idaho June 19, 2007).*

Plaintiff's version of the facts of her arrest showed it was without probable cause and with excessive force, and she stated a claim for relief. Hayhurst v. Upper Makefield Twp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44762 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2007).*

Protective sweep was unjustified and happened prior to arrest or any circumstances that could justify it, and, frankly, was only "half-heartedly" argued by the state. State v. Trudelle, 2007 NMCA 66, 142 N.M. 18, 162 P.3d 173 (2007), cert. granted 141 N.M. 763, 161
P.3d 260 (2007), cert. granted 2007 N.M. LEXIS 661 (2007), cert. quashed 2008 N.M. LEXIS 79 (2008):

[*22] The State half-heartedly asserts that the arrest of Mrs. Trudelle "could arguably support a protective sweep of the premises." This argument fails for three reasons. First, the record appears to show that the officers conducted the protective sweep prior to arresting Mrs. Trudelle. We have previously held that a protective sweep is "uncalled for" where the sweep takes place before the police decide to place a suspect under arrest. Id. Second, the fact that the officers left Defendants unrestrained and allowed Mrs. Trudelle to re-enter the house unaccompanied suggests that the officers did not fear for their safety, at least with respect to Defendants or others who may have remained inside of the house. See id. at 440-41, 806 P.2d at 580-81 (finding that officers did not reasonably fear danger where suspect was left unrestrained and was allowed to re-enter house). Finally, the officers arrested Mrs. Trudelle pursuant to an unrelated, outstanding warrant that the officers happened to discover during or following the protective sweep. Therefore, the arrest of Mrs. Trudelle bears no relation to the protective sweep and cannot be used to justify it.

. . .

[*25] Nevertheless, the State argues that the evidence suggesting the existence of a meth lab on the property, combined with Mrs. Trudelle's arrest and Mr. Trudelle's desire to retrieve his dog from the house, justified the protective sweep. This argument is without merit. First, as we have previously stated, Mrs. Trudelle's arrest was of no consequence with regard to the protective sweep. Second, the record shows that Mr. Trudelle decided to retrieve his dog only after the officers told him that they were going to conduct the sweep with or without his consent. Even if we were to assume that Mr. Trudelle's entry constituted some type of exigency, that exigency would have been of the officers' own making and thus cannot be used to justify the sweep. See State v. Wagoner, 1998 NMCA 124, P 13, 126 N.M. 9, 966 P.2d 176 [hereinafter Wagoner I] ("[T]he exigency should not be one improperly created by law enforcement officers."), overruled on other grounds by Wagoner II, 2001 NMCA 14, P 40.

Probation search walk through did not require reasonable suspicion, and they are not limited to interpersonal contact with the probationer. United States v. LeBlanc, 490 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2007).

Police responded to a domestic dispute including a beating that was called in by a neighbor, and it could not be determined whether the person being beaten and screaming on the other end was a woman or a child. Exigent circumstances were apparent from the call. Richards v. State, 286 Ga. App. 580, 649 S.E.2d 747 (2007).*

30 second delay of sitting at a light that changed is reasonable suspicion to stop. The court had previously held that 8-10 seconds was not, but this was considerably longer. State v. Barnard, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1307 (June 19, 2007).*

Arrest of the wrong man with the same name but at different address as the person named in an arrest warrant was without probable cause where there were no identifiers like the arrestee's social security or driver's license number which were available but not provided. Lucas v. Galloway Township Police Department, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44616 (D. N.J. June 20, 2007):

Instead, Officer Welsh took affirmative steps to change the object of the warrant to Jason J. Lucas, and that act is something considerably more than simply executing a judicially authorized warrant. The Supreme Court has stated that [*23] "if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [probable cause], immunity should be recognized." Schneider, A.2d at 360 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). However, our Constitution does not permit an officer to serve a warrant providing nothing more than a name and address on anyone matching that name; such is beyond the bounds of reasonable belief and is impermissible. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (holding particularity requirement of Fourth Amendment "makes general searches under [warrants] impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what [or who] is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." (emphasis added)). No undue burden is placed on New Jersey's municipal police departments in requiring that officers executing warrants be left with no discretion on whom to serve them. While mistakes will invariably happen, the Fourth Amendment guarantees that mistakes will only be made after proper diligence and regard for our notions of liberty and justice is accorded. Thus, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the facts alleged make out a constitutional violation.

The difference between criminal and civil searches can be dramatic. Consider these two cases from Arizona and the Eighth Circuit decided Wednesday and Thursday:

The defendant had been arrested and was subjected to a strip search, incidentally by a code enforcement officer who had not been trained in doing strip searches, but was the only female around to do it. The trial court suppressed removal of a bag partially protuding from defendant's anus because no warrant was sought because precedent required a warrant for any search that was so intrusive. State v. Barnes, 215 Ariz. 279, 159 P.3d 589 (2007):

P8 The state primarily contends that Armstrong did not intrude beyond the surface of Barnes's body because "no piercing, probing, or even touching of the skin was required to seize" the bag. See State v. Magness, 115 Ariz. 317, 321, 565 P.2d 194, 198 (App. 1977) (visual search of area "around the rectum" permissible in absence of a warrant as part of search incident to arrest.). To address this contention, we must determine whether an officer transforms a lawful warrantless strip search into an intrusion beyond the body's surface requiring a warrant when he or she handles an object protruding from, and extending into, an arrestee's anal cavity. Although the state correctly observes that its officer neither inserted any object, digit, or instrumentality into Barnes, the officer's manipulation and removal of the protruding portion of the bag necessarily exerted force on the portion of the bag extending into Barnes's rectum. And the officer's actions had the effect of moving the portions of the bag within Barnes's rectum as the bag emerged. Once an officer's actions have the effect of exerting force within an arrestee's body, we decline to draw constitutional distinctions based on the mechanism by which the officer does so. The invasion of privacy is the same regardless of the mechanism used. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1449, 1449 n.11 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding "Schmerber governs all searches that invade the interior of the body" and is not limited to "cases in which skin is pierced or entry is forced"). Moreover, the Court's opinion in Schmerber instructs that the intrusiveness of a body search must be assessed in part by the potential risks of inflicting trauma or pain. 384 U.S. at 771- 72, 86 S. Ct. at 1836. Although nothing in the record suggests that Barnes actually suffered any trauma or pain, we have little doubt that an officer's removal of items extending into a suspect's "innards" generally poses such potential risks, the relevant consideration here.

P9 We are not the first court to conclude that an officer must secure a warrant to remove items partially protruding from an arrestee's rectum. In Hughes v. Commonwealth, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159, 162 (Va. Ct. App. 2000), quoting Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 498 S.E.2d 464, 469 (Va. Ct. App. 1998), the court found that an officer's removal of a plastic bag protruding halfway from a defendant's rectum constituted an "intrusive physical body cavity search" requiring a warrant in the absence of both exigent circumstances and "'a clear indication that evidence is located within a suspect's body.'" And, in People v. More, 764 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 2002), quoting People v. Luna, 535 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (N.Y. 1989), New York's highest court characterized physical body cavity searches, such as the seizure of a bag partially protruding from a suspect's rectum, as "'invasive'" and "'degrading'" and found such searches "at least as intrusive" as the blood test procedures addressed in Schmerber. Accordingly, the court held the evidence found in the suspect's rectum should have been suppressed because officers had neither complied with the warrant requirement set forth in Schmerber nor articulated exigent circumstances sufficient to obviate the need for a warrant. More, 764 N.E.2d at 969-70.

The plaintiff was strip searched in a motel room after his arrest, where he was handcuffed and had his pants pulled down by the defendant officer, was bent over, and a tissue was removed from his buttocks. After a four day trial, the jury awarded $35,000 in "nominal" damages which the district court reduced to $1. The parties appealed and cross-appealed, and the Eighth Circuit granted qualified immunity to the officer. Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 490 F.3d 1002 (8th Cir. 2007):

We hold that a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would not have understood that the strip search of [*14] Richmond in his motel room would violate his constitutional rights. The law in April 2001 was clear that strip searches should be conducted in an area as removed from public view as possible without compromising legitimate security concerns. See Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d 654, 656-57 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that visual body cavity searches of prison inmates conducted within view of four to six other inmates did not violate the Fourth Amendment because any measures taken to increase privacy would implicate legitimate prison security concerns); see also Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding the manner of a strip search of an arrestee unreasonable where it was conducted in a police station lobby area with "ten to twelve people ... milling about"). The law was also clear that strip searches should be conducted by officials of the same sex as the individual to be searched. E.g., Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Justice v. Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992). Finally, the law was clear that strip searches should be performed in a hygienic fashion and not in a degrading, humiliating or abusive fashion. Cf. Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a plaintiff stated a valid Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure claim where he alleged that he was subjected to sexual comments about his anatomy and rubbing of his buttocks with a nightstick during strip searches); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (stating that it is unreasonable to conduct a strip search "in an abusive fashion"); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164, 172-73 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding body-cavity searches unreasonable where, inter alia, the searching officers wore a single pair of gloves while searching multiple inmates), overruled on other grounds by Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated by Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1995) (abrogating Unwin).

In this case, the standards for privacy and hygiene clearly were met because only the officers and the arrestee were present for the strip search, the motel room was isolated from public view, the officers were the same sex as Richmond, and Officer Bruce wore a sanitary latex glove. Richmond claims that the search was performed in a degrading, humiliating or abusive manner because he was restrained during the search, he was not allowed to lower his own pants and boxer shorts, and Officer Flesland forcibly bent him over a table for the search. First, while the special verdict form did not ask the jury to make a specific finding as to whether Officer Flesland forcibly bent Richmond over a table, the jury did find specifically that Officer Flesland's conduct during the search was reasonable. This indicates strongly that when the jury rejected Richmond's testimony that the search included a body cavity search, it also rejected his concurrent testimony about Officer Flesland forcibly bending him over a table during the search. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we reject this aspect of Richmond's allegation.