Swearing match between plaintiff and defendant officer over whether officer struck plaintiff in the face with a flashlight while plaintiff was handcuffed was sufficient to deny summary judgment for unreasonable and excessive force. Jones v. Wheeler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40313 (E.D. Ark. June 1, 2007).*

Excessive force claim fails where force used was less than that found in an Eleventh Circuit case to be insufficient. Manning v. City of Atlanta, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40276 (N.D. Ga. June 1, 2007)*:

Here, the facts show that Defendant Price and the other officers used far less force than in Nolin. The officers handcuffed Plaintiff, and upon being informed that he was injured, the officers called for an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived, the officers placed Plaintiff on a bed sheet and dragged him up the hill because the paramedics were unable to reach Plaintiff with a gurney. The court finds that the officers' actions were objectively reasonable considering the context and facts of the situation.

Summary judgment against false arrest action denied. Saucier analysis is problematic and expected at this point in the case. Questions of fact remained on cause for arrest. Friermuth v. City of Puyallup, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40352 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2007):

It is not unusual for the Saucier test to be problematic. This case is no exception. The tension between the directive to make an early determination, and the "reasonableness" of the officer's actions in the context of summary judgment can be difficult. That is especially true in this case where plaintiff's explanation for defendant Pihl's behavior appears to be that he was deliberately untruthful, as opposed to being negligent or mistaken in his judgment. The basis of this credibility characterization is based, in part, on plaintiff's position that Pihl's reported observations of plaintiff's behavior could not be true given the subsequently revealed alcohol and drug test results. This is important given the admonition by the Saucier Court that the court must consider the right in the context of the case.

Because the court is satisfied that the alleged constitutional right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure was well known to defendant Pihl, and because there are questions of fact as to whether or not the arrest was reasonable defendant Pihl's motions for summary judgment and qualified immunity are denied.

Prison inmate's claim of Fourth Amendment violation failed as frivolous because he never alleged that they were unreasonable, which would be incredibly hard anyway. Creer v. Caldwell Corr. Ctr., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40187 (W.D. La. April 5, 2007).*

A police officers' search of an arrestee is unreasonable when the officers conduct a highly intrusive strip search in the parking lot of a public business in the presence of others and there were no exigent circumstances requiring an immediate search. Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 924 A.2d 308 (2007).

Photographs taken during the search of a home by a police officer who entered and searched the home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement are inadmissible under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement if taking the photographs was not related to the purpose for which the officer entered the home. In re The Welfare of J.W.L., 732 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App. 2007).

Because an ineffective assistance claim on a Fourth Amendment claim would fail as a matter of law, post-conviction relief on that ground would be denied. Correa v. Comm'r of Corr., 101 Conn. App. 554, 922 A.2d 289 (2007).*

Furtive gesture in a car justified officer reaching where the person reached. State v. Weidner, 2007 NMCA 63, 141 N.M. 582, 158 P.3d 1025 (2007):

The State argues that in the present case, exigent circumstances existed justifying the seizure of the methamphetamine, given that Defendant was still in the vehicle, which could have been driven away, and that he could easily access the methamphetamine, which was within arm's reach. We find this argument persuasive. The exigency in the present case is stronger than it was in Garcia or Gomez, because in this case Defendant was still behind the steering wheel and within arm's reach of the methamphetamine. Defendant even attempted to conceal the methamphetamine by quickly flipping up the visor. Officer Ahlm testified that he did not believe it would be prudent to tell the other officer about the methamphetamine, as opposed, it appears, to immediately seizing it himself, because Defendant was still sitting behind the steering wheel of the vehicle. The officer was relying on more than just the inherent mobility of the vehicle in acting to seize the contraband. He was also relying on the fact that Defendant was in a position to operate the vehicle, and thereby evade the officers and remove or destroy the evidence. While the inherent mobility of the vehicle itself, alone, did not give rise to the exigency in this case, the fact that Defendant was still sitting behind the wheel of the vehicle supports the existence of the requisite exigency. See Gomez, 1997 NMSC 6, P 44 (noting that in most cases involving an automobile there may be an exigency, but requiring a case-by-case analysis of whether the exigency exists).

The fact the police surrounded a car did not make it "immobile" such that the automobile exception would not apply. State v. Willard, 374 S.C. 130, 647 S.E.2d 252 (2007):

Willard argues because the officers surrounded his vehicle, it was not "mobile" under Carney. However, temporary immobility may still be considered readily mobile so as to qualify for the automobile exception. See Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005) (cases cited therein).

N.D. Cal. holds that a search incident of a cellphone was contrary to purposes of search incident in Chimel, recognizing that it was departing from United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). This is a really interesting discussion and far more sensitive an inquiry into reality and technology than the Fifth Circuit bothered to give the issue in Finley. United States v. Park, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40596 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007):

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has addressed whether officers may search the contents of a cellular phone as a search incident to arrest, and the Court is aware of only one circuit court case on the issue, United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). In Finley, officers arrested the defendant and a passenger in the defendant's car after effecting a traffic stop. Officers seized the defendant's cellular phone at the time of the arrest, and then transported the defendant to the passenger's residence; while at the residence, officers searched the call records and text messages on the defendant's cellular phone, and questioned him about those records and messages. The Finley court held that although the police had moved the defendant, the search was "still substantially contemporaneous with his arrest," and therefore permissible. Id. at 260 n.7. The court also held that "Finley's cell phone does not fit into the category of 'property not immediately associated with [his] person' because it was on his person at the time of arrest." Id. (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15).

The facts in Finley differ slightly from the facts here, since in Finley the search of defendant's cell phone at the passenger's residence was "substantially contemporaneous" with defendant's arrest; here, the search of the cell phone was not contemporaneous with arrest. More fundamentally, however, this Court finds, unlike the Finley court, that for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis cellular phones should be considered "possessions within an arrestee's immediate control" and not part of "the person." Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n. 10. This is so because modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures. n6 Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text, voice and instant messages.

n6 In this case, two of the searched phones were T-Mobile Sidekick IIs; in addition to address books, these phones feature e-mail accounts, text messaging, cameras, instant messenging, Internet capability, and video caller ID. The Court takes judicial notice of these features. See http://www.t-mobile.com/shop/phones/detail.aspx?tp=tb2&device=154e9bca-a74c-4299-99eb-48a1159c922b.

Any contrary holding could have far-ranging consequences. At the hearing, the government asserted that, although the officers here limited their searches to the phones' address books, the officers could have searched any information -- such as emails or messages -- stored in the cell phones. In addition, in recognition of the fact that the line between cell phones and personal computers has grown increasingly blurry, the government also asserted that officers could lawfully seize and search an arrestee's laptop computer as a warrantless search incident to arrest. As other courts have observed, "the information contained in a laptop and in electronic storage devices renders a search of their contents substantially more intrusive than a search of the contents of a lunchbox or other tangible object. A laptop and its storage devices have the potential to contain vast amounts of information. People keep all types of personal information on computers, including diaries, personal letters, medical information, photos and financial records." United States v. Arnold, 454 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

The searches at issue here go far beyond the original rationales for searches incident to arrest, which were to remove weapons to ensure the safety of officers and bystanders, and the need to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969). Inspector Martinovich stated that he initiated the searches because "evidence of marijuana trafficking and/or cultivation might be found in each of the cellular telephones." Martinovich Decl. P 6. Officers did not search the phones out of a concern for officer safety, or to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. Instead, the purpose was purely investigatory. Once the officers lawfully seized defendants' cellular phones, officers could have sought a warrant to search the contents of the cellular phones.

"Considering the arrest warrant affidavit in light of this authority, the court finds there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause for the warrant to issue. Significantly, a factual foundation, supported by bank records, is outlined for violations of 11 Del. C. §§ 841 and 861. Defendant's contention that the arrest warrant affidavit lacks probable cause because it details legal rather than illegal conduct is an issue for trial to determine defendant's intent and is inconsequential to this analysis." United States v. Flood, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40709 (D. Del. June 5, 2007).*

A D.C. speeding and "safety and compliance checkpoint" was unconstitutional because it was set up ad hoc to check driver's licenses [and potentially pretextually to reduce speeding, for which no evidence was offered]. "Ultimately, however, it is not necessary for the Court to decide whether speed prevention was a 'subterfuge' for crime prevention. United States v. McFayden, 275 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 865 F.2d 1306, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1989), abrogated in part by Davis, 270 F.3d at 981. For even accepting the assertion that the roadblock's primary purpose was to prevent speeding, the government has not met its burden of demonstrating that defendant's suspicionless stop was reasonable under Brown's three-part balancing test." On the proof, the roadblock failed all standards. United States v. Hudson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40538 (D. D.C. June 5, 2007).

NAMBLA had no reasonable expectation of privacy when it solicited persons to join and an FBI agent did. United States v. Mayer, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 13022 (9th Cir. June 6, 2007):

Here, NAMBLA invited Agent Hamer to join its group, participate in its holiday card program, attend its conferences, and participate in the privacy committee. He received access to other people, not access to files or information. In essence, NAMBLA invited Agent Hamer to join its social network; his conversations with other members were well within the scope of that invitation, and NAMBLA had no legitimate expectation of privacy in them.

In summary, Aguilar articulates a Fifth Amendment requirement of good faith and a Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Neither requirement becomes more stringent in light of the threat to First Amendment values. Rather, the risk of a First Amendment violation is part of the analysis courts apply under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. We hold that this investigation fell within these bounds.

§ 1983 claim for involuntary commmitment failed as a due process and Fourth Amendment claim because there was plenty of cause for the commitment, confirmed by several doctors. Fisk v. Letterman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40780 (S.D. N.Y. June 6, 2007).*

Removing a boisterous "patron" from the courthouse law library to a holding cell for a little while was not unreasonable. There had been a history of trouble between the plaintiff and courthouse security. Birhanzl v. Doe, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40548 (D. Ore. May 30, 2007).*