Officers standing at a convenience store heard loud party at a nearby mobile home, so they drove over there to "head off" a noise complaint. As they approached, everybody ran inside. Standing outside, they could smell alcohol and there were young people around. That did not create sufficient exigency to enter without a warrant. State v. Ealum, 283 Ga.
App. 799, 643 S.E.2d 262 (2007).

Police got a search warrant for premises, but the warrant did not permit searches of persons associated with the premises. When they arrived, they found people in the front yard talking. They were rounded up and searched, too, but this was outside the warrant. Norton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 790, 643 S.E.2d 278 (2007).

Collateral estoppel barred retrying a suppression motion that was fully litigated in another county years earlier and was the same as the one defendant wanted to try here. People v. Vogel, 148 Cal. App. 4th 131, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 403 (3d Dist. 2007):

The circumstances of this case, however, justify a different result. Defendant does not deny that the Siskiyou County case was a fair adversary proceeding in which he had the opportunity to fully present his case on the question of whether Sergeant Wiley had probable cause to arrest him for annoying or molesting a minor. Moreover, not only did defendant get a full and fair chance to litigate that issue before the superior court, he got a full and fair chance to litigate the issue before this court. Thus, there is no need to allow defendant to relitigate the issue in this case to vindicate his right to a fair adversary proceeding in which he can fully present his case on the probable cause issue. Defendant has had that opportunity already. Under these circumstances, the need to limit litigation must prevail. This result promotes judicial economy, prevents the possibility of an inconsistent determination that would undermine the integrity of the judicial system, and provides repose to the People.

Six days between a sale of heroin and a search warrant for defendant's house was not stale. Prince v. State, 920 A.2d 400 (Del. 2007).*

Defendant was free to walk away from an officer questioning him because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion. Greeno v. State, 861 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind. App. February 27, 2007):

Bobby Greeno appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence collected from his person. In this interlocutory appeal, he asserts the warrantless search to which he was subjected was unconstitutional. The Fourth Amendment permits a police officer, without any reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing, to approach a citizen to ask questions; however, that citizen remains free to ignore the questions and walk away. Accordingly, when a citizen in such a circumstance walks away from the officer, the officer must have reasonable suspicion a crime is, was, or is about to occur prior to yelling "stop" and chasing the citizen. Because the officer had no reasonable suspicion when he yelled for Greeno to stop and then chased after Greeno, his warrantless search of Greeno was improper. We therefore reverse the denial of Greeno's motion to suppress.

A person who calls 911 and can be identified by her telephone number, identifies herself as a neighbor's daughter, and police were able to call her back was not an anonymous tipster because she made herself responsible for the veracity of the information. United States v. Thompson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13183 (N.D. Okla. February 26, 2007):

n1 Defendant refers to this female caller as an anonymous tipster. The Court finds that, although the female caller's name is unknown, she is not an anonymous tipster. The female caller identified herself as the daughter of the woman who lived at 4686 North Main Street. Further, she appears to have provided the police with her phone number (or at least the police had a record of her phone number) because they were able to contact her after the initial call. While the police did not know the female caller's name, they had sufficient information to determine her identity. In this way, the caller was not anonymous and could be held responsible if her allegations turned out to be fabricated. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)("Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to fabricated, ... an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.").

Congress's authority to establish post offices does not provide exclusive federal authority over search of mail such that state regulators over untaxed tobacco cannot search mail shipments of tobacco products to a federally recognized Indian tribe. Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881(6th Cir. February 28, 2007).

Search incident of bag on which defendant was lying before arrest was valid although he was handcuffed and moved to another part of the room at the time of the search. United States v. Derrick, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 4398 (11th Cir. February 27, 2007)* (unpublished).

Dispute of fact on excessive force in throwing plaintiff to the ground during an arrest or nudging him to get down precluded summary judgment. David v. Hageman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13358 (C.D. Ill. February 27, 2007).*

Abandoning a firearm while fleeing arrest is not the product of a seizure under Hodari D. United States v. Billups, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13311 (N.D. N.Y. February 26, 2007). Here, guilt is another question:

Applying Hodari D. and Swindle to the facts of this case leads to the inescapable conclusion that Defendant was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment until the police officers tackled him. Thus, the firearm, which Defendant abandoned before the officers tackled him, is not a product of a Fourth Amendment seizure. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion to suppress the gun which the K-9 search uncovered beneath a plastic garbage bag. n2

n2 The Court notes, however, that, based upon the facts adduced at the suppression hearing, in particular the fact that the firearm was not swabbed for prints and, therefore, there is no evidence that Defendant ever handled the firearm, and the fact that none of the witnesses were able to explain how the firearm, which Defendant allegedly tossed as he was running, ended up beneath a garbage bag, the Court has some reservations about whether the Government will be able to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this gun was in Defendant's possession at the time of the incidents in question.