Soon, the right margin will have links to slip opinions so those without Lexis or Westlaw will be able to get opinions as soon as possible.

It will look like this, and you can scroll down to this until it is on the right margin:

Latest Slip Opinions:
U.S. Supreme Court
Federal Appellate Courts {{as a link, opening up a list of federal circuits; state courts will be separate, of course}}
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
State Appellate Courts

Some U.S. District Courts post major decisions publicly on their websites so one does not have to access them through PACER. Looking through all 93 federal district court websites would not be productive because so few cases end up publicly posted that it is not worthwhile.

New Jersey holds in two cases that the state DNA act can be applied to crimes occurring before its effective date and it applies to juveniles, even under 14, who have committed acts which would be a felony if committed by an adult. A.A. v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 189 N.J. 128, 940 A.2d 260 (N.J. January 24, 2007), aff'g 384 N.J. Super. 67, 894 A.2d 31 (2006); State v. O'Hagen, 189 N.J. 140, 914 A.2d 267 (N.J. January 24, 2007).

Defendant was arrested in his house, but the search incident did not occur for twenty minutes after the officer called to talk to others. There is no time limit on when a search incident can occur, and there was no intervening act of consequence, so the search incident was valid. United States v. Wong, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4468 (N.D. Cal. January 9, 2007):

Based upon the record before the Court, the Court finds that the search of defendant's bedroom was "roughly contemporaneous" with his arrest. Cagney's phone call to Martinovich was not an intervening act, but rather was "part of a continuous, uninterrupted course of events" of conducting the search. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d at 893. Cagney called Martinovich to inform him that he had found marijuana and a shotgun in defendant's bedroom, and Martinovich told Cagney that he had found an operating marijuana grow to which defendant was believed to be connected. The call took place during the course of the search, and was topically related to the search. Accordingly, the Court finds that the call to Martinovich did not invalidate the search incident to arrest.

Although it is a closer call, the Court concludes that based upon the evidence submitted, the alleged questioning of defendant also did not constitute an intervening act. Defendant states that officers questioned him for 15 to 20 minutes after he was arrested. Significantly, however, defendant does not state that officers questioned him before conducting the search of his bedroom; defendant's reply declaration is silent on when the alleged questioning took place. Defendant's reply declaration also does not provide any specific information regarding what allegedly transpired during the questioning. Because there is no evidence before the Court that defendant was questioned prior to the commencement of the search, the Court finds that there was no intervening act to invalidate the search of defendant's bedroom as a search incident to arrest.

NYC Sanitation officers entered plaintiff's paper and cardboard recycling business property following a private hauler's truck to inspect it. He sued over the entry, and they moved to dismiss on the ground that the recycling business held a permit and that made it closely regulated. The district court disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss without developing the record much more. Based on what was presented thus far, the court cannot conclude that the recycling business fits the Burger test for a closely regulated industry. Meserole St. Recycling, Inc. v. City of New York, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4580 (S.D. N.Y. January 23, 2007).

Execution of a nighttime search warrant was permissible under 21 U.S.C. § 879 even though F. R. Crim. P. 41 limited nighttime searches. The Sixth Circuit has not held that special rules govern execution of nighttime searches. Plaintiff's handcuffing in her bed with flashlights shining in her face at night was not unreasonable. (The probable cause for obtaining the warrant not being at issue.) All of plaintiff's claims fall within the realm of a reasonable exercise of police authority in controlling the situation during the execution of a search warrant, even at night. Taylor v. City of Detroit, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4587 (E.D. Mich. January 23, 2007).

Defendant had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a police car by the DEA. After being advised of a right to refuse consent, he refused consent to search his house, and the officers then got on a cellphone to call to see about getting a search warrant. Then the defendant consented to the search. On the totality of the circumstances, his consent was valid. United States v. Woods, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4529 (D. Idaho January 22, 2007). (Note: The officers also had an admission from a jail telephone call to a woman that he consented to the search that was used at the suppression hearing.)

Defendant was involved in a traffic stop just before 3 a.m. in an SUV. When the officer ran his name, the driver came back as being involved in thefts. On the video, the officer mentioned that he was not accusing the defendant of anything but that his name had come up as being involved in some thefts, and the officer asked for permission to get the serial numbers off some car parts in the back of the SUV. The defendant consented to this search, and a gun was found. The search was valid. United States v. Bauer, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4517 (N.D. Iowa January 22, 2007).

Defendant who broke into his parent's house because he had been kicked out and had no key had no standing to challenge the police search of the house on the parent's call to the police about the break-in. United States v. Ochse, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4515 (D. S.D. January 19, 2007):

Although defendant formerly lived in his parents' home, it is of no consequence now. At the time of the search, defendant did not live in his parents' residence. This fact was corroborated by defendant's father during his contact with the sheriff's department as he reported defendant's break-in. Defendant was not in possession of a house key and had no other way to access the home when his parents were not present; rather, defendant used extreme force to enter the house.