Consent to look in a car in New York is not consent to search it. Suppression order affirmed. People v Hall, 2006 NY Slip Op 9751, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15595 (4th Dept. December 22, 2006):

The People failed to prove the substance of the conversation between defendant and the police officers, and the court was therefore unable to determine what a reasonable person would have understood from the exchange. In addition, even if we accept either version of the conversation presented at the hearing as the operative one, the People established only that the officers asked defendant if they could check the vehicle or look in the vehicle. Consent to check or look in a vehicle is not consent to search it (see People v Love, 273 A.D.2d 842; People v Saunders, 161 A.D.2d 1202; People v Lazarus, 159 A.D.2d 1027, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 738).

Police responded to a 911 call of a car alarm going off. They arrived in one minute and heard no car alarm. They saw a pickup truck with a laptop computer in the back, and the indicator light was on and they seized it and a notebook and took them to the police station. When they opened it, they found forged documents. The seizure and search could not be justified under the emergency exception because there was no threat to life and limb of the police. Suppression order affirmed. People v Fravel, 2006 NY Slip Op 9725, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 15618 (4th Dept. December 22, 2006).

After a controlled buy, police got a search warrant for the premises. Due to surveillance, they knew there was a gray car parked outside with a man with a walkie talkie in it. On execution of the warrant, officers were justified in approaching him and ordering him out of the car as a suspected lookout. They smelled burnt marijuana, and that justified a further search. State v. Grant, 2006 Ohio 6821, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6749 (2d Dist. December 22, 2006).*

Police responded to an anonymous child abuse call that also involved drug usage by the defendant. They did a knock and talk, and the defendant refused entry. The court discussed the specificity of the information and added that the police could have also concluded that the defendant's refusal to consent added to their suspicion. After defendant was arrested, the officers could conclude his statement to them supported a second entry to look for drugs. State v. Lane, 2006 Ohio 6830, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6752 (2d Dist. December 22, 2006):

[*P35] The Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed similar facts in State v. Boggess (1983), 115 Wis.2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516. In Boggess, an anonymous caller indicated that two children at defendant's home may have been battered and needed medical attention, and also indicated that one of the children was limping, and the defendant had a bad temper. The Court upheld the warrantless entry of the defendant's home and noted the objective test of the emergency rule exception is satisfied when, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that there was an immediate need to provide aid or assistance. Like the anonymous call in Boggess, the call in this case contained some specificity. It specifically indicated George Lane at the Dennison address was selling drugs around two children and abusing them causing one to suffer a busted lip. It is also relevant that Lane denied there were any children in his home before one child suddenly appeared. Also, the police could have become even more suspicious of Lane's conduct when he withdrew his permission to permit the officers to look for the other child. Although it is close, we believe the police could have reasonably believed that the other child mentioned in the call was in need of immediate aid at the time they entered Lane's home. The drugs discovered in the living room were discovered in plain view after the lawful entry. The first assignment of error is overruled.

. . .

[*P44] We believe that it was objectively reasonable for Officer Adams to believe that Lane's statement in the cruiser to him that there were other drugs in his bedroom was an invitation by Lane to him to enter his house and retrieve them. This is so particularly since Lane had seen the police enter his home just minutes earlier and find drugs in his living room. The second assignment is overruled.

Comment: So much for the exercise of a constitutional right not being used against you.

Vehicle remained sufficiently mobile under the automobile exception after defendant's arrest for DUI drugs that it could be searched. The trial court erred in suppressing. State v. Meharry, 342 Ore. 173, 149 P.3d 1155 (December 21, 2006), rev'g 201 Ore. App. 609, 120 P.3d 520 (2005).

NJ statute permits drug testing of students on individualized suspicion of being under the influence at school. Plaintiffs' son was clearly suspected of being under the influence because he was ADD and was suddenly acting like he was stoned, which he was. The testing here was constitutional. Parental consent was not constitutionally required, but the parents were notified according to law. Gutin v. Washington Twp. Bd. Of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. N.J. December 21, 2006):

It is important to note at the outset that the policy at issue is not one of suspicionless or random testing. Rather, the School District's policy provides for testing only upon an individualized suspicion that a particular student is under the influence of drugs in school. Contrast Bd. of Ed. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)(school district policies authorizing random urinalysis drug testing of students). Therefore, the issue presented is whether the Fourth Amendment requires parental consent in every case before testing a student who is reasonably suspected of being under the influence of drugs while in school. The Court concludes that parental consent is not required by the Fourth Amendment.

. . .

The Court fails to see how lack of consent renders drug testing based on reasonable individualized suspicion unconstitutional. In T.L.O., the search of a student's purse upon suspicion that she was violating her school's smoking prohibition was held constitutional even though the student did not consent to the search. After a teacher took T.L.O. to the Assistant Vice Principal, the Vice Principal "asked T.L.O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse he found a pack of cigarettes." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. Similarly here, Adam was taken to the Assistant Principal's office based on the suspicion that he was under the influence, whereupon Adam's mother was notified and arrangements were made to have Adam screened for drug use at Kennedy Hospital.

Moreover, the Third Circuit's analysis in Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2000), supports the conclusion that lack of consent is not fatal to a reasonableness finding. In Hedges, parents of a New Jersey public high school student challenged the drug testing of their daughter pursuant to the school district's drug testing policy. The student was observed by her teacher as having glassy, red eyes with dilated pupils and acting uncharacteristically. Hedges, 204 F.3d at 112-13. Based on these observations, the student was sent to the school nurse upon suspicion of being "high." Id. After being examined by the nurse, the student was eventually taken to a hospital where a blood test and urinalysis were conducted. Id. at 113.

The police could rely on an anticipatory warrant that had a clear triggering point of word from an informant inside that the package had actually gone into the place to be searched. United States v. Serrano, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 31523 (10th Cir. December 20, 2006)* (unpublished).

Defendant had no standing to challenge the search of his mother's car when he disclaimed control over it and had no key at the time of the search. United States v. Fisher, 213 Fed. Appx. 584 (9th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished).