A federal jury in Manhattan ruled yesterday that an NYPD policy that existed between May and July 2001 to deliberately delay procecessing of protestors when other, similarly situated offenders would get a desk ticket for a later appearance in court was unconstitutional. See Police Policy Found Unconstitutional:

A jury in Federal District Court found yesterday that a police policy applied to demonstrators arrested for minor offenses between May 1 and mid-July 2001 was unconstitutional. In a case presented by some 360 plaintiffs, the jury agreed with lawyers who argued that senior police officials had issued orders for demonstrators arrested on minor charges to be put through a long processing, including a night in jail. The jury found that the police treated the demonstrators more harshly than they did nondemonstrators arrested on the same kind of charges, but rejected a claim that about 300 had been unfairly treated under an unwritten practice dating from 1999. Alan Levine, a plaintiffs’ lawyer, said negotiations on behalf of about 30 clients eligible for damages under the verdict would begin soon.

Two inventory policies lead to different results in Indiana and Ohio:

Putting defendant into handcuffs but advising him that he was not under arrest 40 minutes into a stop made the consent invalid. A reasonable person in his position would not feel free to leave. State's alternative theory that inventory justified the search failed because the defendant was permitted to remove college books from the car before the inventory and state policy permitted owners to remove valuables from the car before the inventory, and here he was not permitted to do so. Friend v. State, 2006 Ind. App. LEXIS 2573 (December 18, 2006).

Where the policy, however, required the officer to actually itemize what the defendant removed from his vehicle that he was taking with him, that policy was not unconstitutional. [Policy here could not be recited exactly by the officer because the handbooks were collected and put online, but that did not trouble the court.] State v. Flynn, 2006 Ohio 6683, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6591 (3d Dist. December 18, 2006).

Dropping a backpack and walking toward officer to talk about a burglary was an abandonment of the backpack. People v. Novakowski, 368 Ill. App. 3d 637, 306 Ill. Dec. 417, 857 N.E.2d 816 (1st Dist. December 8, 2006).

Informant's information was corroborated when he was riding with officers to meet somebody for a drug deal and the defendant showed up as predicted. State v. Guillory, 942 So. 2d 73 (La. App. 3d Cir. November 2, 2006, released for publication December 12, 2006).

Stop was justified based on defendant's vehicle matching description of vehicle involved in multiple burglaries in area. State v. Phillips, 2006 Ohio 6710, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6600 (4th Dist. December 11, 2006).*

Officer's prolonging stop for 25 minutes to get drug dog to scene for a sniff was unreasonable. There was no objective basis for concluding that the defendant was involved in any drug activity, just because he had been seen near a house where there was drug activity as much as two months earlier. The court declined to adopt a bright line rule on length of a stop but had no difficulty concluding that a 25 minute detention to give a warning ticket and stall for a drug dog was unreasonable. Seabolt v. State, 2006 OK CR 50, 152 P.3d 235 (December 15, 2006).

Defendant's admitting an informant into his house was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if the informant was acting as an agent of the police. State v. Smith, 2006 UT App 485, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 538 (December 7, 2006).

Stop that turned into the officer "ask[ing]" the defendant to get out of his car and "place his hands on top of the car" was a show of authority, and consent was a submission to a show of authority. Davis v. State, 946 So. 2d 575 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. December 18, 2006).

Plain view of a holster after a stop based on reasonable suspicion justified looking for the weapon. United States v. Harlson, 212 Fed. Appx. 694 (9th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished):

Officer Tucker knew of the following facts at the time he detained Harlson: (1) Harlson was present in a high-crime area during an unusual hour; (2) Harlson was outside a business establishment that appeared to be closed; (3) Harlson had the screen door to the business establishment propped open; (4) Harlson had moved between the business establishment and his vehicle multiple times; and (5) Harlson had watched Officer Tucker "very closely" as Officer Tucker drove by. These facts, taken together, were sufficient to justify a Terry stop.

Pointing a gun at an unsuspecting person during a protective sweep of a building during entry for an arrest was not unconstitutional, based on the fact the U.S. Marshals were looking for a violent suspect. Komongnan v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D. D.C. 2006).

Use of chokehold during plaintiff's arrest raised factual issues that could not be resolved on summary judgment because plaintiff showed enough to get to trial that it might have been excessive. Watts v. Williams, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90640 (D. D.C. December 15, 2006).*

Officer had cause to stop the defendant because the license on the vehicle had been reported as stolen. When he observed the defendant fiddling with his keys, he noticed something on the key chain that he recognized as a probable container for drugs, and its search was not unreasonable. LaPlant v. State, 2006 WY 154, 148 P.3d 4 (December 15, 2006).*

Officers were looking for defendant's wife, an EMT, whom they believed was missing. They went to the defendant's home at 4:30 a.m. and knocked, got no answer, but the door was unlocked and they entered. Inside, the officers found the defendant's daughters asleep. They asked the girls where their mother was, and they said that she was at a river with their dad, spending the night. The officers opened a closet looking for her and found a mushroom growing operation. They continued looking for her and found her and then applied for a search warrant to go back. The opening the closet door was reasonable under the emergency exception. Moulton v. State, 2006 WY 152, 148 P.3d 38 (December 15, 2006):

[*P24] Upon arriving at the residence and receiving no response to their efforts to make their presence known, it was reasonable given the urgent sounding early morning radio transmission from an EMT for the deputies to enter the home to look for Ms. Moulton. Even after talking with the daughter, it was reasonable for the deputies to look for Ms. Moulton in other areas of the house, including the master bedroom. Once inside the bedroom, the deputies were authorized to see what was in plain view. All of the evidence indicated the drug growing paraphernalia was in plain view. No evidence was presented to suggest the deputies had intentions, other than to locate Ms. Moulton, when they looked inside the home. After discovering the items in the master bedroom, Deputy Motley said to Deputy Klier, "[W]e are not here for this. We have got a possible emergency. We are here to find Ms. Mouton and make sure she is all right." Once they determined Ms. Moulton was not there, the deputies left the residence. They were inside the house for about seven minutes. Under these circumstances, the district court correctly concluded the search of the Moulton residence for Ms. Moulton was not illegal or improper, but rather fell appropriately with the emergency assistance exception to obtaining a search warrant.