Defendant worked at a Kroger store, and she was outside with a friend who had just bought a lot of kitchen matches with another friend. The off duty officer working loss prevention suspected the matches were going to be used to manufacture meth. The officer questioned the purchaser, and defendant tried to go back into the store; the officer said "Ms. Botto, can you come back here please?" This was a seizure. She later consented to a search of her work apron which produced a small quantity of meth. Botto v. Commonwealth, 220 S.W.3d 282 (Ky. App. 2006).

Police received an anonymous call about a suspicious person at a particular location, and they saw the defendant and another jump over a short brick wall leaving the premises. When stopped, the defendant said that it was her house, and she hopped over the wall because she had lost her key to the gate. The police entered her house and searched illegally. The motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Marley, 945 So. 2d 808 (La. App. 4th Cir. November 8, 2006, released for publication January 11, 2007).

Furtive movements to the pocket when a police officer was observed in a high crime area was cause for a patdown for a weapon. State v. Kelly, 946 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 4th Cir. November 21, 2006, released for publication January 25, 2007).*

The fact information from an illegal search made it into a search warrant did not void the search under the warrant. The trial court is directed to excise the information derived from the illegal search from the affidavit and retest the balance to see if probable cause remains. State v. McKinney, 361 N.C. 53, 637 S.E.2d 868 (December 15, 2006), rev’g 174 N.C. App. 138, 619 S.E.2d 901 (2005) (which suppressed whole search).

“After careful review of the record and the applicable case law, we conclude that the duration of the stop is not the determinative issue in this case. At issue is whether, once the warning had been given and Rutledge was told he was free to go, the continued detention of the parties was reasonable.” Here, it was, and the trial court’s suppression order is affirmed. State v. Lavender, 2006 Ohio 6632, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6553 (6th Dist. December 15, 2006).*

Defendant with his girlfriend was questioned by police, and, when the officer asked about a gun because he saw a gun cable lock, defendant’s girlfriend said “Here, I’ll show you.” The trial court’s finding of consent was not clearly errenous. State v. Keggan, 2006 Ohio 6663, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6561 (2d Dist. December 15, 2006).*

In a bizarre case of a citizen's alleged paranoia and impersonating a police officer (which he was acquitted of), he sued various police officers and Assistant State's Attorneys. There were many claims, but the only one that is of interest here is that mailing him a summons was not a seizure. The officer had no ticket book when he stopped the plaintiff. Tweeton v. Frandrup, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90533 (D. Minn. December 12, 2006):

As an initial matter, "the view that an obligation to appear in court to face criminal charges constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure is not the law." Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Jefferson v. City of Omaha Police Dep't, 335 F.3d 804, 806 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Eighth Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether an individual is seized when ordered to appear in court, but noting that "several of our sister circuits have been disinclined to expand fourth-amendment law in" this way). Because court attendance is not a seizure, Tweeton has failed to demonstrate any deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

Stop of bus at permanent immigration checkpoint led to questioning of passenger about her citizenship status, and the immigration officer thought it suspicious how protective the defendant was of her bag [apparently he has never traveled with a computer]. In a quick series of questions taking about ten seconds, she consented to a look into her bag, and a brick of marijuana was seen. The District Court suppressed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the stop was of short duration and that it was not unreasonable. United States v. Jaime, 473 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. December 15, 2006):

The second principle thus relied on in Machuca-Barrera is that the permissible duration of a suspicionless stop at a fixed immigration checkpoint includes the time necessary to "request consent to extend the detention." Id. at 433. Thus, we held:

"The scope of an immigration checkpoint stop is limited to the justifying, programmatic purpose of the stop: determining the citizenship status of persons passing through the checkpoint. The permissible duration of an immigration checkpoint stop is therefore the time reasonably necessary to determine the citizenship status of the persons stopped. This would include the time necessary to ascertain the number and identity of the occupants of the vehicle, inquire about citizenship status, request identification or other proof of citizenship, and request consent to extend the detention." Id. (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

On the basis of the foregoing two principles, we held that Machuca-Barrera's suspicionless detention at the checkpoint was legal because its duration, up to the time he gave his consent to search, was objectively reasonable, and thereafter the duration of his detention could be lawfully extended without any other justification. We stated:

"... the permissible duration of the stop was the amount of time reasonably necessary for Agent Holt to ask a few questions about immigration status. Agent Holt's few questions took no more than a couple of minutes; this is within the permissible duration of an immigration checkpoint stop. Although Machuca-Barrera notes that Agent Holt asked a question about drugs, we will not second-guess Agent Holt's judgment in asking that question. The brief stop by Agent Holt, which determined the citizenship status of the travelers and lasted no more than a couple of minutes before Agent Holt requested and received consent to search, was constitutional." Id. at 435.

It is clear that Machuca-Barrera dictates the result here. There, the time elapsed between the agents' initial contact with the defendant until he consented to the request to search his vehicle was "no more than a couple of minutes;" here the comparable time was clearly less than half a minute. During that period of time three things occurred in Machuca-Barrera. First, citizenship and travel plan questions were asked and answered, the answers reflecting United States citizenship, and that is likewise the case here. Second, in Machuca-Barrera, the agents asked questions about carrying drugs and guns, which were answered in the negative, and we declined to "second-guess" the asking of that question or to engage in "inquiry into the subjective purpose of the officer asking the questions." The next thing that occurred in Machuca-Barrera was that consent to search the car was asked for and given, and we expressly and specifically held that the permissible duration of a suspicionless fixed checkpoint immigration stop included the time reasonably necessary to request consent to extend the detention (and, by necessary implication, to receive the reply to the request) by consenting to search of the vehicle. Here, what immediately followed the citizenship and travel plan questions and answers, was Jaime being asked if the bag was hers, and on her promptly responding that it was, whether she would consent to its search and her affirmative reply. Clearly the question whether the bag was hers was a part of, and a necessary predicate to, asking her consent to search it, and hence should be treated in the same way as the request for and receipt of consent to search was in Machuca-Barrera. But, even wholly apart from that, there is no conceivable justification for holding that the bag ownership question and answer impermissibly extended the duration of the stop here, while the carrying drugs or weapons question and answer in Machuca-Barrera did not.

The Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Atkinson, 209 Fed. Appx. 957 (11th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished), that a Franks challenge, one of five issues raised, "lack[ed] merit" after oral argument and was not even discussed.

Defendant's flight from approaching officers was not a seizure under Hodari D. "Assuming that the detectives' pursuit of Coley was a show of authority, Coley ran and, therefore, did not submit to it." United States v. Coley, 464 F. Supp. 2d 487 (D. Md. December 13, 2006).*