Stop based on suspicious presence and with reasonable suspicion in a known drug area for likely dealing drugs carries with it the ability to pat down the suspects because drugs equates with likely presence of firearms. United States v. Gavin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88145 (E.D. Mich. December 6, 2006).

Search warrant was overbroad for various failures to specify the items to be seized and should have been suppressed under Groh. "Neither the officer's personal knowledge of the crime nor a proper execution of the search may cure an overbroad warrant." "That the affidavit was attached to the warrant is irrelevant because the warrant did not incorporate the affidavit by reference." "Moreover, the general reference to evidence of domestic violence second degree assault under RCW 9A.36.021 authorized seizure of items for which there was no probable cause." "Finally, the warrant failed to differentiate between items subject to seizure and those that were not." State v. Higgins, 136 Wn. App. 87, 147 P.3d 649 (December 5, 2006):

Here, the warrant in no way limited the search to illicit items. Indeed, the broad reference to RCW 9A.36.021 allowed seizure of such innocuous items as household cleaners, home pregnancy tests, literature with sexual content, and fireplace pokers. And the warrant contained no list of examples to guide the search. Accordingly, the search was executed pursuant to an overbroad warrant and all items seized should have been suppressed.

An operating meth lab is inherently dangerous and, therefore, exigent circumstances justifying an immediate warrantless entry to neutralize it. A warrant was obtained to continue the search. Barth v. State, 955 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2006):

We expressly agree with the conclusions of these courts and hold that the operation of a methamphetamine lab is inherently dangerous, presents an immediate threat to public safety, and is well within the scope of the exigent circumstance exception.

In the instant case, the detectives had reasonable cause to believe that Barth had a methamphetamine lab in operation within the dwelling based on their experience, facts developed during investigation, and observance of Barth's activities that day. Thus, their initial entry into the residence was based on clear exigent circumstances and was therefore lawful.

Because the detectives took the precaution of waiting until the search warrant arrived before reentering the residence and conducting their search, we need not examine whether the exigent circumstances justifying the initial entry also justified the subsequent search and seizure of the evidence Barth sought to have suppressed. Instead, the search was conducted pursuant to a properly executed warrant, and the evidence discovered during that search was therefore admissible. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984); State v. Riley, 462 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1984); Mercier, 579 So. 2d at 309.

Record supports the conclusion that the defendant consented to a search of his person during a traffic stop. State v. Conn, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 935 (November 21, 2006). Nothing is mentioned, however, that this extended the detention of the initial stop or that there was any reasonable suspicion. Apparently, in Tennessee, it is permissible to ask any motorist for a search of the person without cause.

Inventory of defendant's car was conducted by a parole officer, even though he was not on parole. The PO was acting as an LEO under state law and as an agent of the officer at the time, and the inventory is valid. State v. Nash, 2006 Ohio 6396, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6346 (5th Dist. December 4, 2006).*

911 call brought officers to defendant's residence, and one of the other two occupants consented to an entry and search, which defendant did not dispute. State v. Ramirez, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 928 (December 4, 2006).*

In Utah, one judicial district destroyed search warrant papers and let the police be the repository of all search warrant papers. The Utah Supreme Court granted an extraordinary writ against the local courts ordering that they must keep the records to protect the integrity of the warrants and supporting papers. Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, 2006 Utah LEXIS 213 (December 5, 2006):

[*P21] The issues raised by this petition are similar to those that confronted this court in In re Criminal Investigation. In that case, this court faced myriad challenges to the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act. 754 P.2d at 636. Among those challenges was the claim that the Act failed to provide for adequate records of subpoenas issued pursuant to the Act. Id. at 644. While acknowledging that the Act did not include a provision expressly requiring the maintenance of investigatory records, the court relied on various provisions of the Act suggesting that the legislature had anticipated detailed record-keeping. Id. at 653. The court further noted that adequate records were necessary in order for the courts to fulfill their constitutional role of protecting against abuse of subpoenas issued under their authority. Id. The court then called upon its inherent supervisory authority to require that all investigations under the Act be fully documented and that "such documentation . . . be maintained by the district court authorizing the investigation." Id.

[*P22] We adopt a similar approach here. Giving law enforcement sole custody of all affidavits and warrants up through the point where the warrant has been executed and a return filed is inherently problematic for at least two reasons. First, it leaves the court without any record of the subpoena or the materials supporting its issuance until after the subpoena is executed and a return filed. Second, it allows for the possibility that affidavits and other court records may be mishandled or even altered without detection. When the records upon which the magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are handled by persons other than court personnel prior to being filed with the court, the court has no basis for confidence in the accuracy, authenticity, or completeness of those documents. In the matter of warrants for the search and seizure of persons or property, more is required. We accordingly require that magistrates issuing search warrants retain in their custody copies of all search warrants issued, as well as the material supporting search warrant applications, rather than surrendering to law enforcement the only copies of such material.

[*P23] To ensure the integrity of our court records, we have concluded that the courts of this state must retain copies of all search warrants and supporting material. Nevertheless, we are without the information necessary to prescribe the particular procedures to be followed in maintaining and disclosing such records. Those particulars are best addressed by study and examination in the context of our rule-making process. We therefore refer those particulars to our Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure for further consideration.

Officer acting on another's information was correct in making a stop, but, without the other officer testifying at the suppression hearing, there is no way to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for detaining the defendant. The state had to justify the actions of the officer in court, and it was not the officer's fault. People v. Moorman, 369 Ill. App. 3d 187, 307 Ill. Dec. 428, 859 N.E.2d 1105 (2d Dist. November 29, 2006, released for publication January 19, 2007).*

IAC allegation that defense counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress on lack of apparent authority of another to consent to the search that led to evidence in his case did not show that the motion would have been successful, so petitioner cannot prevail. State v. Stringer, 949 So. 2d 464 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006, released for publication January 4, 2007).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion during the stop from the defendant passenger's excessive nervousness and his efforts to keep the officer from talking to the driver, his wife. After the officer got her out of the car and talked to her, reasonable suspicion had come together, and consent was sought and refused. Then a drug dog was brought out to sniff the car. The refusal to consent was not a factor in the use of the dog because of the existence of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jones, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88040 (M.D. Tenn. December 5, 2006).

The exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. United States v. Pittman, 209 Fed. Appx. 725 (9th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished), following United States v. Hebert, 201 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000).

Confidential informant's statement satisfied NY's Aguilar-Spinelli rule. People v Collins, 2006 NY Slip Op 9061, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14462 (3d Dept. December 7, 2006):

Judging the warrant, as we must, under the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test ..., we conclude that the application was sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the source of the information and the basis of at least one of the confidential informant's knowledge .... The information provided by the third informant, in affidavit form, was against such informant's penal interest ... and was both thorough and specific concerning defendant's drug operations at the location sought to be searched .... The identification of defendant as being involved in drug-related activities was also consistent with not only the information provided by the two other informants but also the objective information acquired by the detective that assembled the warrant application .... (citations omitted)