Maryland, following other states, decides to follow Belton and Thornton and holds that search incident of a recent occupant of a car extends throughout the passenger compartment under Chimel. Purnell v. State, 171 Md. App. 582, 911 A.2d 867 (December 4, 2006):

Notwithstanding that Maryland has yet to extend the Belton/Thornton bright line test specifically to the search of items belonging to a passenger situated several feet from the vehicle arguably outside of the Chimel reach, who is neither under arrest or suspected of criminal activity at the time of the search and who neither poses a threat to the officer's safety or is capable of destroying evidence, we believe that the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Nebraska has divined the clear direction of the Supreme Court in Belton and Thornton. It is the whole of the passenger compartment that is subject to search, including any items or containers and the content thereof, belonging to the driver or an occupant regardless of whether he or she has been placed under arrest or is within or has been ordered out of the vehicle.

The community caretaking function justified a stop of the defendant who had fallen out of a tree to see if he was injured, and, on closer examination, appeared to be intoxicated. People v. Queen, 369 Ill. App. 3d 211, 307 Ill. Dec. 400, 859 N.E.2d 1077 (1st Dist. November 28, 2006, released for publication January 19, 2007):

The principles annunciated in Cady, Ocon, and Smith apply in the present case. The parties agree that Fragale effected a stop when he "directed" defendant over to the squad car. The State, arguing for a community caretaking rationale in substance if not in name, asserts that defendant's bizarre and potentially injurious entry onto the scene gave Fragale warrant to "stop and check on" him. Defendant, operating under the erroneous notion that all seizures must be justified by an objective suspicion of criminal activity, does not challenge the State's position nor could he credibly do so. Defendant had just fallen out of a tree. Although Fragale quickly surmised that defendant was not injured by the fall, Fragale suspected that defendant was intoxicated, based on his unsteady movements. Fragale was justified in having defendant approach and identify himself. When defendant approached, his appearance and demeanor confirmed Fragale's belief that he was intoxicated. Fragale believed that defendant was in need of a courtesy ride in the squad car because he could not proceed safely in his condition without assistance. Fragale's concern was well-founded. Defendant's unexplained bout of tree climbing suggested that he might be capable of further erratic behavior that could endanger himself or others. He was covered in mud that apparently came from some prior escapade.

Stop of vehicle based on an anonymous informant's tip was justified because of location and the fact it appeared to be armored. Officer in plain view saw a banana clip, and that lawfully expanded the stop. Trial court's suppression order reversed. State v. Carrocce, 2006 Ohio 6376, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6331 (10th Dist. December 5, 2006).*

Stop for crossing white line was not justified on the record, so DWI suppressed. State v. Phillips, 2006 Ohio 6338, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6321 (3d Dist. December 4, 2006)*; State v. Purtee, 2006 Ohio 6337, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 6323 (3d Dist. December 4, 2006).*

(Still in trial. Tomorrow's posting at unknown time.)

Suppression motion litigated and not appealed in first trial in 1988 involving a search in Montana and used in court in Illinois was collateral estoppel or res judicata after the defendant won a new trial. His allegation of "new evidence" to get around the rule was, inter alia, "Montana law," but all the allegedly "new evidence" was available at the time of the first trial. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 860 N.E.2d 178 (September 21, 2006).

Defendant, who was allegedly shot during a home invasion robbery and the police came to the hospital, did not have standing to challenge the seizure of a hospital glove from the floor of the ER. If the police did not take it, it would just be thrown away. United States v. Nanos, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87434 (D. Me. November 30, 2006).

Consent was shown to be voluntary despite the defendant not having been advised of his right to refuse. He was middle-aged, and his interaction showed that he knew his rights. "In this case there is no evidence Defendant was unaware of his rights. To the contrary, Defendant had some knowledge of his rights to refuse to consent as evidenced by his asking permission to speak with Leonard about whether he should voluntarily open the shed and later at the jail when he wrote he 'was not waivering [sic] his rights' beside his signature on the Waiver of Rights form." United States v. Stringer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87302 (M.D. Tenn. November 29, 2006).*

(Trial today. More later.)