Using a program developed by Microsoft, the Toronto police child exploitation unit was able to trace the internet source of a live sexual assault of a child and apparently raid the house where it originated. See the AP's Canadian Nabbed in Live Web Sex Assault.

[Officer] Krawczyk, who was posing as an online pedophile, said he established a relationship with the man in an Internet chat room for pedophiles in January.

After the detective gained his trust, the suspect on Sunday sent still images recorded on a Web cam, which were transmitted in "real time" to a private site, which Krawczyk declined to disclose.

"I can't get into exactly what the program is," Krawczyk told The Associated Press. "But you see the images immediately. I was talking with him and, I can't get into the details of what were in the pictures, but I knew that it was happening live."

The article does not mention a warrant, and the images were not transmitted into the U.S., but this would be a classic case of exigent circumstances. Also, the police are reluctant to talk about the program other than to say that it exists, as though providing details would somehow defeat it.

We should expect similar occurrences here, if they haven't happened already.

Tennessee DUI roadblock satisfied its tough constitutional standards of State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1997). State v. Clark, 2006 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 849 (October 20, 2006):

We note that the ultimate question in this case is whether the third prong of the Downey test weighs in favor of the checkpoint's reasonableness. The witnesses' testimony established that the MCSD announced the checkpoint in the local newspaper prior to March 12 and that all vehicles traveling in both directions were stopped at the checkpoint. When traffic became congested, Sergeant Tucker temporarily suspended the checkpoint until traffic cleared and the checkpoint could resume. The MCSD set up signs at each end of the checkpoint to warn approaching motorists; the MCSD used safety cones and marked patrol cars with emergency lights; and officers wore safety vests and carried flashlights, demonstrating that the checkpoint was conducted in a safe manner. All of these factors were enumerated in Downey and weigh in favor of finding that the checkpoint did not violate constitutional requirements. Moreover, Sheriff Lewis' selecting the location for the checkpoint and the MCSD's setting up and operating the checkpoint in accordance with predetermined guidelines weigh particularly heavily in the State's favor. See Hicks, 55 S.W.3d at 533 (stating that "the most important attribute of a reasonable roadblock is the presence of genuine limitations upon the discretion of the officers in the field"); Downey, 945 S.W.2d at 110-11 (stating that "[v]irtually every court has emphasized the importance of limiting the discretion of police officers at the scene").

According to the predetermined guidelines in this case, officers were to approach stopped motorists, identify themselves, and announce the purpose of the checkpoint. Officers then were required to "release the vehicle without further delay" if they saw no signs of intoxication or to detain any driver suspected of impaired driving. The appellant has made no claim that the checkpoint officers failed to follow these procedures. Therefore, we conclude that the level of intrusion to motorists was minimal in this case and that the stopping of motorists at the checkpoint was reasonable. The trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to suppress the evidence against her.

Private search of former boyfriend's place did not involve the Fourth Amendment. The police got into it after it happened. State v. Willis, 169 Ohio App. 3d 364, 2006 Ohio 5754, 862 N.E.2d 906 (2d Dist. 2006).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a suppression motion after he determined that it would not be successful, which it would not have been. Ex parte Jones, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9563 (Tex. App. – Dallas November 3, 2006).*

Arrest for disorderly conduct was unjustified, and the defendant consented to a frisk for weapons. In the watch pocket of his jeans, the officer felt what he thought was a joint, but it turned out to be a dollar bill. Opening the dollar bill exceeded the consent, even though the officer had reason to believe that the dollar bill contained crack, which it did. State v. Chauvin, 945 So. 2d 752 (La. App. 5th Cir. October 31, 2006).

Defendant had no standing to contest the search of a garbage bag of marijuana that he placed in the trunk of a friend's car before he got in it. He had standing to challenge the stop but not the search of the bag. Valle v. State, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1361 (November 2, 2006).

Officers had PC for defendant's arrest when he called informant back and arranged a meet for a drug sale and then showed up. State v. Guillory, 945 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 3d Cir. November 2, 2006).*

Traffic stop at night led officer to window of car, and he shined his flashlight in and saw drugs in plain view. State v. Gray, 2006 La. App. LEXIS 2388 (5th Cir. October 31, 2006, released for publication January 19, 2007).*

Stop for riding bicycle at night without a headlight was justified, and defendant abandoned drugs when he was stopped. Because there was a factual basis for the stop, pretext could not be shown[, no matter how much it looked like it]. State v. Leonard, 945 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 5th Cir. October 31, 2006, released for publication January 19, 2007).

ICE officers had reason to believe that aliens were in a house in Puerto Rico, but they were waiting for confirmation, and they kept the house under surveilllance. When a car leaving it was stopped, officers got confirmation of the illegals inside. That gave PC, but the officers were also told that the illegals would move shortly, so they could not leave to get a warrant. The move did not occur at the time described by the persons stopped, so the officers waited a little longer, then approached the house for a knock and talk, and everybody bailed from the house. District court goes so far as to find exigent circumstances for an entry. United States v. Perez-Quirzola, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80032 (D. P.R. October 5, 2006).

"Defendant's consent for the law enforcement agents to search his home was obtained in writing at his office prior to any interrogation. The audio recording of his interrogation further confirms that the search was made with the voluntary consent of the Defendant. In the absence of any factual allegations of coercive conduct, the Court finds that Defendant's consent was given voluntarily and his motion to suppress the fruits of the search is denied." United States v. Conteh, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80063 (S.D. N.Y. November 1, 2006).*

"The distinct odor of burnt marijuana, by itself, coming from the window of a stopped vehicle will provide probable cause to search a vehicle. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993). The detection of the odor of marijuana justifies a search of the entire passenger compartment, including locked compartments where contraband is likely to be concealed. Id. at 1489." United States v. Baylor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80042 (D. Kan. October 31, 2006).

Crime victim was not an informant. The information from the victim was also corroborated and not stale, albeit three weeks lapsed between the information about a gun and drugs and the issuance of the warrant. United States v. Johnson, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79988 (D. Ore. October 26, 2006).*

Unjustified entry with guns drawn, ordering elderly man out of house first, was obviously not consensual. Later attempted consent was invalid because it was tainted by the original entry. United States v. Minnis, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79920 (S.D. Fla. November 1, 2006):

Accordingly, not having obtained valid consent to enter the residence, officers needed either a search warrant--which they did not have--or probable cause and exigent circumstances before it was legally permissible for them to enter that home. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 205; United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 668 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)). As explained in the August 28, 2006 R&R, there were neither in this case. Because none of the constitutional prerequisites for a warrantless entry without consent were present, and because the law deems this entry presumptively unconstitutional, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's motion to suppress be granted, and that the evidence seized from Defendant's residence and the statements Defendant made on April 25, 2006, be suppressed.n6

n6 We have, however, drawn a distinction between the initial entry - that lacked legal consent - with the consent that was later obtained, after the passage of time and after additional steps were taken by law enforcement to establish voluntariness. As explained in footnote 15 of the R&R, if a legal initial entry occurred contrary to the R&R's conclusion, the passage of time, the use of a consent form that was later read to Ferguson and the Defendant, and their express consent at that point without any threat or show of force, all made it possible for Ferguson and Defendant to consent to a search after the protective sweep was conducted. Officers in fact obtained that consent. But for the other reasons argued in the R&R, that later consent to search (not enter) cannot save the government's unlawful and warrantless entry into the apartment. See, e.g., Santa, 236 F.3d at 676-79 (illegal warrantless entry tainted consent to search provided immediately after illegal entry and all evidence seized thereunder).

Plaintiff's actions gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain him. He was disheveled, smelled bad, and pacing around the front of the Cook County courthouse at 6:30 a.m. They decided to ask him for identification, and he claimed to be a "federal process server," but he refused to identify himself. He was attempting to serve the sheriff with process at a shift change. Plaintiff's conduct and words made them have reasonable suspicion that he was potentially dangerous, and summary judgment was properly granted. Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. November 3, 2006).*

Plaintiff was at a Breeder's Cup event in Texas, and he was drawing the structure of the building with pictures of pigs in military uniforms and other references to possible religious beliefs. Security guards were notified by a patron, and they came and looked. After detaining him, they called the ATF which sniffed his van, and they looked in it in the parking lot. ["Paranoia strikes deep. Into your life it will creep." --Stephen Stills] The detention and search were reasonable enough to qualify for qualified immunity. Govea v. ATF, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 27216 (5th Cir. November 2, 2006)* (unpublished).

Defendant was driving his girlfriend's car with her permission, so he had standing to challenge its search. Search of the car was based on PC, and it was valid. United States v. Brown, 203 Fed. Appx. 997 (11th Cir. November 2, 2006).

The Eleventh Circuit rejected an IAC claim on grounds not related to the Fourth Amendment, but it mentioned that two defendants removed from a car with two "cookies" of crack were put in a police car and recorded where they made admissions of knowledge of the drugs in the car. United States v. Downs, 217 Fed. Appx. 841 (11th Cir. 2006)* (unpublished).