Reliance on a telephonic search warrant looking for evidence of a mugging by defendant was objectively reasonable and would not be suppressed. United States v. Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71696 (D. Nev. April 23, 2013).*

Knowledge of a warrant out for defendant is justification for a stop. United States v. Harper, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71727 (W.D. Ark. May 21, 2013),* R&R 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71729 (W.D. Ark. April 4, 2013).*

Defendant’s coerced consent claim fails. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71336 (S.D. Ga. April 16, 2013).*

Particularity and overbreadth in white collar crime: a rare granting of suppression in a no-fault insurance scheme search warrant. The particularity requirement protects important values. The good faith exception does not apply here. United States v. Zemlyansky, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71818 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (Oetken, J.):

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The Supreme Court granted cert Monday in Fernandez v. California. Issue:

Whether, under Georgia v. Randolph, a defendant must be personally present and objecting when police officers ask a co-tenant for consent to conduct a warrantless search or whether a defendant’s previously stated objection, while physically present, to a warrantless search is a continuing assertion of 4th Amendment rights which cannot be overridden by a co-tenant.

Opinion below: People v. Fernandez, 208 Cal.App.4th 100, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 (2d Dist. 2012), posted here as Cal.2: Police can remove defendant and ask for consent from co-tenant; rejecting 9th Cir. authority.

For what it is worth, this is on the petition of the citizen accused which suggests, but does not guarantee, a reversal. After all, can the police really just circumvent Randolph by removing the objector then asking around for consent until they find an unaware third party to ask? Come on...

Forbes: Once Reserved For Drug Crimes, Wiretapping Takes Center Stage in White Collar Prosecutions:

“Today, tomorrow, next week, the week after, privileged Wall Street insiders who are considering breaking the law will have to ask themselves one important question: Is law enforcement listening?”
- Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for Southern District of New York

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Police saw defendant on a bicycle talking to somebody in a dark SUV. When they stopped, the SUV left, other people scattered, and defendant pedaled away. He was stopped because riding his bicycle on the sidewalk violated city code. His sagging pants were pulled up for a search incident, and a baggie of marijuana was revealed stuck in his sock. Pulling up his pants was legal. State v. Butler, 2013 La. LEXIS 1147 (May 17, 2013).*

The search warrant affidavit here did in fact show a sufficient connection to defendant and a robbery murder for there to be probable cause. The victim’s blood on his sock was admissible. Commonwealth v. Almonte, 2013 Mass. LEXIS 343 (May 20, 2013).*

Defendant was standing next to his car with the door open into traffic with a 40 oz bottle in his hand. An unmarked car stopped. The officer had at least PC that defendant had an open container. When he saw it was the police, he made a furtive movement to his waist suggesting a gun. The office moved toward him, and he attempted to flee, getting only three steps before being tackled. His attempted frisk was valid. United States v. Terry, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10167 (3d Cir. May 21, 2013).*

“Respondent Kim Maurice Fuerst’s decision to silently remain behind a locked door inside his home did not constitute an express refusal of consent to a police search. Therefore, Fuerst’s wife’s free and voluntary consent to the search of the couple's home was valid as to Fuerst.” People v. Fuerst, 2013 CO 28, 2013 Colo. LEXIS 331 (May 20, 2013).

Defendant’s girlfriend was a cousin of a police officer investigating defendant, and she freely and voluntarily consented to search of her place finding stuff to use against defendant. State v. Blevins, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 503 (May 20, 2013).*

The credibility on consent goes to the officers stopping defendant because the stop was based on a burned out brake light, something disprovable by a cell phone picture that anybody could take (but nobody did). If they wanted to come up with a bogus reason for the stop, it would have been something not provable at all, like crossing the centerline or not coming to a complete stop. United States v. Kelley, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71785 (E.D. Ark. May 21, 2013).*

Defendant was reported to the police as “suspicious and disoriented.” When they found him, he was intoxicated. There was nothing to suggest he was dangerous. “[T]he information the Officers possessed about Defendant did not indicate that he was armed and dangerous.” The frisk could not be justified by that. The officers felt, however, that defendant was a danger to himself or others, and the court finds probable cause for a frisk before taking him“into protective custody under Colorado's Emergency Commitment statute.” United States v. Gilmore, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71178 (D. Colo. May 14, 2013).*

Co-defendant passenger had standing to challenge the stop (which was valid) but not the search of the vehicle owned and driven by another. United States v. Desjardin, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70770 (D. Nev. May 17, 2013).*