MI: Unreasonable mistake of law justifies exclusion

Defendant was stopped based on what the court previously found was a lack of reasonable suspicion from an unreasonable application of law. It previously remanded to the court of appeals to determine whether the exclusionary rule should apply. The court of appeals said it should not. On further review, the state supreme court held that an unreasonable mistake of law should result in exclusion. People v. Lucynski, 2024 Mich. LEXIS 1425, at *2-5 (July 26, 2024):

Having determined that a Fourth Amendment violation in fact occurred, we remanded this case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the exclusionary rule applied. Id. at 657-658. On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that application of the exclusionary rule was not appropriate in this case. People v Lucynski, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 27, 2023 (Docket No. 353646). The Court of Appeals, relying on Herring v United States, 555 US 135 (2009), concluded that, although this Court held that Deputy Robinson’s mistake of law was objectively unreasonable, it was “also true that Deputy Robinson did not demonstrate any deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct.” Lucynski, unpub op at 5. Further, the panel found no record evidence that “Deputy Robinson acted in bad faith when he effectuated a traffic stop of [defendant]. Nor was there any evidence this stop was part of a systemic effort to subvert [defendant’s] constitutional rights.” Id.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals and hold that the exclusionary rule applies in this case. “Application of the exclusionary rule to a constitutional violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 240 (2007). “Generally, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings.” In re Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 265 (1993); see also Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961). The exclusionary rule does not automatically apply once a court finds a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, “[t]he suppression of evidence should be used only as a last resort.” Frazier, 478 Mich at 247, citing Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 (2006). This is because “‘[t]he exclusionary rule is “a harsh remedy designed to sanction and deter police misconduct where it has resulted in a violation of constitutional rights ….”‘” Frazier, 478 Mich at 247 (citations omitted). More specifically, the exclusionary rule “is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Id. at 247-248 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “‘[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.'” Id. at 248, quoting People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 (2004) (alteration in original).

Here, Deputy Robinson provided two reasons for the traffic stop: (1) the factually unsupported suspicion that a drug deal took place, which he communicated to defendant during the traffic stop; and (2) a suspected violation of MCL 257.676b(1), which he did not mention until the preliminary examination in this case. The former reason unquestionably weighs in favor of application of the exclusionary rule. An officer who seizes a person based only on an unsupported, inchoate hunch has acted in clear violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and, thus, has committed misconduct. Exclusion is warranted in such a circumstance. See People v Soulliere, 509 Mich 950, 951 (2022) (explaining that a trial court did not err by granting the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence where a deputy’s observation that gave rise to a traffic stop amounted “to nothing more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch”) (quotation marks and citations removed).

Similarly, Deputy Robinson’s objectively unreasonable belief that defendant violated MCL 257.676b(1) also weighs in favor of exclusion. Although the Court of Appeals here relied on Herring, in which a police error was not found to warrant application of the exclusionary rule, that decision is distinguishable from this case. In Herring, an officer unknowingly relied on an invalid arrest warrant when arresting the defendant, due to a “bookkeeping” error beyond the arresting officer’s knowledge or control. 555 US at 137-138. Under these facts, the United States Supreme Court explained that suppressing evidence “obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently recalled warrant” produces a marginal or nonexistent deterrent effect on police misconduct. Id. at 146. It is easy to follow the logic of this decision. Suppression “turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” Id. at 137. Therefore, excluding evidence that was obtained as a result of reasonable reliance on a mistake made by a third-party would not necessarily deter police misconduct because there is no culpable or wrongful police conduct to deter. In other words, where the police error “was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,” the exclusionary rule should not apply. Id. at 137.

Such is not the case here. Instead, we conclude that a seizure based on an officer’s unreasonable interpretation of the law warrants application of the exclusionary rule. …