C.D.Cal.: Inquiry into actions of others besides the officers involved in search is a new Bivens claim and barred

“Second, the type of evidence necessary to prove Plaintiffs’ case differs from Bivens. Bivens required only an inquiry into the actions of arresting officers. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs challenge the propriety of Zellhart’s warrant application and special search procedures, requiring the Court to delve ‘into evidence before numerous decisionmakers,’ including the agents themselves and the magistrate judge. … In this manner, Plaintiffs’ claim requires ‘fact-checking and conscience-probing’ that poses a great ‘risk of intruding on the investigatory and prosecutorial functions of the executive branch.’ [¶] For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claim presents meaningful differences from the claim in Bivens, and thus presents a new context for the doctrine. The Court next determines whether special factors counsel hesitation in creating a new Bivens claim.” Pearsons v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46514 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024).

Plaintiff stated a claim for relief that he was the wrong man arrested. Spriestersbach v. Hawaii, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45948 (D. Haw. Mar. 15, 2024).*

“The fact that the officer did not believe that he had probable cause to stop defendant until defendant committed a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation is of no moment. ‘Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis’ (Whren v United States, 517 US 806, 813 [1996]; ….” People v. Williams, 2024 NY Slip Op 01389 (4th Dept. Mar. 15, 2024).*

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