A person acquitted at trial but arrested with probable cause has no claim. Probable cause for arrest survives an acquittal. Davis v. City of Apopka, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 22680 (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2023):
After all, probable cause can survive an acquittal. See, e.g., Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1971) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement was not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the officers arrested the wrong person); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 663-64, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the prevailing view in this country a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved.”); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979) (“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted — indeed, for every suspect released.”); Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (same).
This Court has quoted with favor Judge Learned Hand’s wise observation that “the ‘reasonable cause’ necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties.” Marx, 905 F.2d at 1507 (quoting United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) as quoted in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 n.4, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959)); accord, e.g., Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 n.9 (11th Cir. 1990) (“‘Probable cause’ defines a radically different standard than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ and while an arrest must stand on more than suspicion, the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence sufficient to obtain a conviction.”); United States v. Pantoja-Soto, 739 F.2d 1520, 1524 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances known to the officers could persuade a reasonable officer that there is a “substantial chance of criminal activity” by the person who is arrested. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57. A substantial chance is all that is required, “not an actual showing of such activity.” Id.; see also Washington v. Durand, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that the correct standard to evaluate whether an officer had probable cause to arrest a suspect is to “ask whether a reasonable officer could conclude that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity”) (alteration adopted) (emphasis added) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61).
Probable cause is not a technical concept that only the legally trained can apply. Actually, it’s designed to be just the opposite. The Supreme Court has reminded us that: “On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370 (quotation marks omitted); see also Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013); Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (“Perhaps the central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception.'”) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).
That means evidence of every element of a crime is not required for a showing of probable cause. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 32 L. Ed. 2d 612 (1972) (“Probable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.”); Gates, 884 F.3d at 1300; Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007) (“No officer has a duty to prove every element of a crime before making an arrest.”). We have never imposed “a rigid requirement that an arresting officer must have specific evidence” of suspects’ “subjective intent” when their conduct “otherwise gives rise to probable cause to arrest.” Gates, 884 F.3d at 1300; Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (“[N]o police officer can truly know another person’s subjective intent.”); United States v. Everett, 719 F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that evidence of intent was not required for probable cause to arrest for passing or possessing counterfeit money). We have pointed out that arrests are different from criminal prosecutions, and “[p]olice officers are not expected to be lawyers or prosecutors.” Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1355 (quotation marks omitted). And “officers are not required to perform error-free investigations or independently investigate every proffered claim of innocence.” Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229 n.10.
Neither are officers expected to be judges. It is not unusual to find at the scene of a crime evidence pointing in different directions, but “[a] law enforcement officer is not required to resolve every inconsistency found in the evidence.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286. That is especially true because on-the-scene officers are often “hampered by incomplete information and forced to make a split-second decision between action and inaction.” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469, 477, 132 S. Ct. 987, 181 L. Ed. 2d 966 (2012) (reversing a court of appeals in an exigent circumstances case for “not heed[ing] the … wise admonition that judges should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s assessment, made on the scene,” and for not following the Court’s instructions that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving”) (second alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has been unequivocal about that. So has this Court.
