WV: Juvenile “pick-up” order issued on PC was equivalent of warrant for Payton purposes for entry into mom’s home

Entry on a juvenile “pick-up” order here “was founded upon probable cause to believe that her ‘health, safety and welfare’ demanded it …. was the functional equivalent of an arrest warrant and was lawfully issued.” Therefore, the entry was valid under Payton. State v. Pennington, 2022 W. Va. LEXIS 694 (Nov. 14, 2022) (with a lengthy dissent).

From the court’s syllabus, in light of Egbert v. Boule (2022), “The panel held that there was no Bivens cause of action for plaintiff’s claim, which presented a new context. And given this new context, special factors counseled against implying a cause of action here. For example, Fourth Amendment excessive force claims against Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) officers would have ‘“systemwide” consequences’ for BLM’s mandate to maintain order on federal lands, and uncertainty about these consequences provided a reason not to imply such a cause of action. The panel further determined that plaintiff had alternative remedies, including administrative remedies. And while plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act were based on a different legal theory, in plaintiff’s instance they were an alternative avenue to seek damages for the injuries alleged in her Bivens claim.” Mejia v. Miller, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 31401 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2022).

Defense counsel wasn’t ineffective for not challenging the scope of his consent. The search was within that scope. United States v. Escalera, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205707 (W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2022).*

The allegedly false statements in the multiple warrant affidavits either weren’t false or weren’t material to probable cause. United States v. Knox, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205770 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2022).*

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