D.Minn.: “‘The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a standard of practical accuracy rather than a hypertechnical one.'”

“’The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a standard of practical accuracy rather than a hypertechnical one.’” Defendant’s particularity argument fails. It was particular enough, and good faith exception applies. United States v. Jones, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185980 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2022):

“The Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is a standard of practical accuracy rather than a hypertechnical one.” United States v. Maccani, — F.4th —, No. 21-2642, 2022 WL 4352161, at *3 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 2022) (quotations and alteration omitted). The warrant’s description of the property to be searched as including “any vehicles . . . associated to the address” (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 7), was sufficiently specific to comply with the Fourth Amendment and allow the search of the vehicle parked across the street from the address.

Even if the warrant application was insufficiently particular, however, there is no question that the Leon good-faith exception applies here. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). …