N.D.Iowa: If a vehicle’s registration comes back to an unlicensed owner there is reasonable suspicion for the stop even if SCOTUS holds otherwise in Glover because of GFE

If a vehicle’s registration comes back to an unlicensed owner, there is reasonable suspicion for the stop even if SCOTUS holds otherwise in Kansas v. Glover. Probable cause developed after the stop. United States v. Legarrea, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25633 (N.D. Iowa Feb. 13, 2020):

In his R&R, Judge Roberts acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court is currently considering the constitutionality of a similar traffic stop in Kansas v. Glover, No. 18-556. (Doc. 32, at 7). Judge Roberts concluded that the resolution of Glover is irrelevant here because Officer Kirkpatrick reasonably relied on existing Eighth Circuit precedent, see Chartier, 772 F.3d at 542. (Id.). Defendant objects, asserting that the resolution of Glover is outcome-determinative here. (Doc. 37, at 7). The Court finds that Judge Roberts’ conclusion on this issue was correct but requires elaboration.

“[N]ewly announced rules of constitutional criminal procedure must apply retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011) (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Retroactive application does not, however, determine what appropriate remedy (if any) the defendant should obtain.” Id., at 243. Indeed, “[r]emedy is a separate, analytically distinct issue.” Id. Thus, “the retroactive application of a new rule of substantive Fourth Amendment law raises the question whether a suppression remedy applies; it does not answer that question.” Id., at 243-44.

In United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that the good faith exception created in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), can apply despite the retroactive application of a newly created rule of constitutional criminal procedure. Id., at 249-50. The purpose of suppression through the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Leon, 468 U.S. at 909. The Supreme Court held that an officer who acts “in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than act as a reasonable officer would and should act under the circumstances.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Thus, deterrence of police misconduct may not be achieved by suppressing evidence as a result of a retroactively-applied rule. Id., at 249 (“[T]he police in his case reasonably relied on binding Circuit precedent. That sort of blameless police conduct, we hold, comes within the good-faith exception and is not properly subject to the exclusionary rule.”).

Here, even if Glover ultimately finds that police may not stop a vehicle without affirmatively identifying that it is driven by an unlicensed person and defendant’s case remains pending on direct appeal at that time, suppression would not be an appropriate remedy. Officer Kirkpatrick stopped defendant’s vehicle in reasonable reliance on Chartier, which is binding Eighth Circuit precedent. Thus, Officer Kirkpatrick’s conduct falls within the Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The purpose of deterring police misconduct would not be furthered by suppression here. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 249. Thus, the Court finds that the resolution of Glover does not affect the issue of suppression here.