FL1: Leon’s “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” doesn’t seek to determine whether PC actually exists; it’s whether it is conclusory and “bare bones”

Leon’s “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” doesn’t seek to determine whether probable cause actually exists. It’s whether the affidavit is so conclusory it is “bare bones.” Wingate v. State, 2020 Fla. App. LEXIS 1369 (Fla. 1st DCA Feb. 6, 2020):

In short, the “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” exception does not just seek to determine whether sufficient probable cause exists. “[M]ere insufficiency of the affidavit to support probable cause will not preclude the application of the Leon good faith exception.” United States v. Doyle, 650 F.3d 460, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). Instead, the “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” exception applies only where the “affidavit is ‘bare bones,’ i.e., ‘it fails to provide a colorable argument for probable cause.'” United States v. Jobe, 933 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “‘Bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause.” United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1992). Unless the affidavit is “bare bones” containing “wholly conclusory statements,” the “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” exception does not apply.

II.

That exception plainly does not apply here. The affidavit included information showing, among other things, that Wingate was associated with the residence at issue and that Wingate had sold drugs to a confidential informant in a controlled buy at that residence. Considering all of the affidavit’s contents, and applying the standards above, we find no basis to conclude that the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an officer’s belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.