MO: Def’s stop became a seizure with RS and search of backpack was without PC

Defendant was stopped walking with another to a hotel in Columbia, Missouri by an officer pulling up behind them and turning on the patrol car’s emergency lights. Back up arrived, and defendant and his companion were told to put the backpacks down for safety, which they did. The stop, even if it started as consensual (likely not) turned into a detention without reasonable suspicion. Their patdown produced nothing. The search of the backpacks was unreasonable. State v. Johnson, 2020 Mo. App. LEXIS 129 (Feb. 4, 2020):

Even if we were to view the initial stop as consensual, by the time Deputy Richardson asked if he could search the backpack the encounter was without question a detention. The men had been patted down, their backpacks had been set to the side, and other deputies had arrived and positioned themselves to prevent Johnson and his companion from running away. At this point, Deputy Richardson had learned that the men were headed to a nearby hotel to visit friends. Although the hotel was known for criminal activity, Deputy Richardson still did not possess specific and articulable facts that supported a reasonable suspicion that these individuals were engaged in criminal activity. Their destination, which was known to be a high crime area, was yet another context-based factor which would apply to anyone headed to that hotel. We have found that connection to a “drug house” supported a reasonable suspicion. See State v. Johnson, 427 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Mo. App. 2014) (holding a Terry stop was justified when the appellant had been seen congregating in front of a known drug house); State v. Smith, 373 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Mo. App. 2012) (holding that the fact that the appellant had just left a drug house supported a finding of reasonable suspicion). The incriminating explanations for visiting a drug house far outnumber the innocent ones. There are plenty of innocent reasons, however, why people visit hotels, even those located in high crime areas.

Because the initial detention of Johnson was unlawful, all of the evidence subsequently obtained as a result of that unlawful detention is fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. See State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146-47 (Mo. banc 2011). Nonetheless, “errors in admitting evidence require reversal only when prejudicial to the point that they are outcome-determinative.” State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Mo. banc 2006). As the State’s case rests entirely on evidence obtained from the illegal detention, admitting the same was clearly outcome-determinative. The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed.