Officer came to scene at plaintiff’s house and parked his car within the running area of a dog on a lease between two trees. The plaintiff came out to get the dog. It barked at the officer. When the dog got to the end of his lease and couldn’t go any farther, the officer walked up and, essentially, executed the dog by shooting him in the head. There is no case in the circuit on point, but the law everywhere else agrees that a dog is an “effect” under the Fourth Amendment, and the use of deadly force to unnecessarily kill a dog is a Fourth Amendment violation. Taking the complaint at face value, which is the standard of review at this point, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity. Ray v. Roane, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1885 (4th Cir. Jan. 22, 2020):
We acknowledge that there is no “directly on-point, binding authority” in this circuit that establishes the principle we adopt today. Booker, 855 F.3d at 543. Until now, we have never had the occasion to hold that it is unreasonable for a police officer to shoot a privately owned animal when it does not pose an immediate threat to the officer or others. Still, even without “directly on-point, binding authority,” qualified immunity is inappropriate if “the right was clearly established based on general constitutional principles or a consensus of persuasive authority.” Booker, 855 F.3d at 543; Owens, 372 F.3d at 279-280. This is such a case.
First, we observe that the unlawfulness of Roane’s alleged actions was established by the general principles we espoused in Altman. In Altman, we held that privately owned dogs are protected under the Fourth Amendment, and further established that the reasonableness of the seizure of a dog depends on whether the governmental interest in safety outweighs the private interest in a particular case. 330 F.3d at 203-05. Based on these broader principles alone, it would have been “manifestly apparent” to a reasonable officer in Roane’s position that shooting a privately owned dog, in the absence of any safety rationale at all, is unreasonable. Owens, 372 F.3d at 279.
The consensus of our sister circuits leaves no doubt that this principle was clearly established by September 2017. See id. at 279-280. As the D.C. Circuit observed in 2016, prior to Roane’s alleged conduct in this case, “[e]very circuit that has considered the issue … ha[s] invariably concluded that ‘the use of deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an immediate danger and the use of force is unavoidable.'” Robinson v. Pezzat, 818 F.3d 1, 7, 422 U.S. App. D.C. 35 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep’t, 844 F.3d 556, 568 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A] police officer’s use of deadly force against a dog . . . is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when … the dog poses an imminent threat to the officer’s safety.”); Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the reasonableness of officers’ conduct is contingent on there being “a genuine threat to officer safety”); Viilo v. Eyre, 547 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ommon sense … counsel[s] that the use of deadly force against a household pet is reasonable only if the pet poses an immediate danger[.]”); San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “any reasonable officer [would know] that the Fourth Amendment forbids the killing of a person’s dog, or the destruction of a person’s property, when that destruction is unnecessary”); Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he state may [not], consistent with the Fourth Amendment, destroy a pet when it poses no immediate danger[.]”).
Based on this preexisting consensus of persuasive case law, together with the general principles we announced in Altman, we hold that a reasonable officer in Roane’s position would have known that his alleged conduct was unlawful at the time of the shooting in this case. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Booker, 855 F.3d at 543. Thus, we hold that the district court erred in concluding Roane is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.
Notably, Roane does not contest the legal principle we adopt today, namely, that it is unreasonable for an officer to shoot a privately owned dog when the dog poses no objective threat to the officer or others. Instead, Roane’s arguments exclusively focus on the underlying facts, and ultimately amount to the factual assertion that Roane reasonably perceived Jax as a threat at the time of the shooting. But this is an appeal from a motion to dismiss, which tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not its veracity. For the reasons discussed above, we cannot accept Roane’s version of the facts at this stage of the proceedings, in which we must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of Ray. DePaola, 884 F.3d at 484.
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)