Riley doesn’t apply to parole searches of cell phones. Commonwealth v. Murray, 2017 PA Super 363, 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 928 (Nov. 15, 2017):
4 Several federal courts that have addressed this issue following Riley have concluded that Riley’s holding is inapplicable to parole searches. See, e.g., United States v. Luna, 602 Fed.Appx. 363, 365 (9th Cir.) (holding that warrantless search of parolee’s cell phone “was a constitutional parole search”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 102, 193 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2015); United States v. Johnson, 579 Fed.Appx. 920, 926 n.6 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Riley … has no application to the instant case because here [the defendant] waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of parole.”); United States v. Johnson, No. 14-CR-00412-TEH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106925, 2015 WL 4776096, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (“[E]very federal court that has addressed the application of the parole search exception in the wake of Riley has found that the exception remains valid.”); United States v. Martinez, No. CR 13-00794 WHA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112347, 2014 WL 3956677, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014) (concluding that Riley was “inapplicable to [the defendant] because he was on parole and was subject to a parole search condition”); United States v. Dahl, 64 F.Supp.3d 659, 661-64 (E.D.Pa. 2014) (holding that warrantless search of probationer’s cell phone was proper where probation officer had reasonable suspicion of probation violation under Delaware law). But see United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2016) (concluding that warrantless search of probationer’s cell phone was unconstitutional where condition in probation order did not clearly encompass search of cell phone and its data and search did not promote legitimate governmental interest of combatting recidivism because probationer was convicted of non-violent drug offense and had merely missed his meeting with probation officer).