Defendant could not show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises of a third person, although he was the person being looked for. The court discusses Steagald and the Ninth Circuit’s en banc Underwood (1983, Treatise §§ 29.03 n.13 and 29.15 n.8), and concludes that defendant can’t win on any Steagald theory for lack of standing. In addition, the state could not object to the specificity of the motion to suppress after the hearing. The court and state knew the issues, and that’s waived. State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-7556, 2017 Ohio LEXIS 1689 (Sept. 13, 2017):
[*P79] To challenge the admission of evidence found during a warrantless search, however, a defendant must have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), fn. 1; Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). In Steagald, the defendant seeking suppression of evidence had that expectation because the home searched was his residence. 451 U.S. at 208-211, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38. The court expressly noted that it was not deciding “whether the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a search warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home.” Id. at 219.
[*P80] Martin here raises the question reserved in Steagald: whether the person named in an arrest warrant may object, under the Fourth Amendment, when police arrest him in another person’s home after entering without a search warrant.
[*P81] The overwhelming majority of decisions hold that when the police enter one person’s home without a search warrant in order to execute an arrest warrant upon another person, the person named in the arrest warrant may not complain of the Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Bohannon, 824 F.3d 242, 248-252 (2d Cir.2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 628, 196 L.Ed.2d 517; United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 481-482 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1092-1093 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 483-484 (9th Cir.1983) (en banc); United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064, 1068-1069 (11th Cir.2015); Commonwealth v. Tatum, 466 Mass. 45, 50-53, 992 N.E.2d 987 (2013); State v. deLottinville, 890 N.W.2d 116, 119-122 (Minn.2017) (petition for certiorari filed May 19, 2017).
[*P82] Some authorities, however, take the contrary view that because a guest may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host’s residence, he may seek to suppress evidence obtained by warrantless entry into the host’s residence, even though the guest was the subject of an arrest warrant. E.g., 6 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, Section 11.3(b), at 203 (5th Ed.2012); Underwood at 486-492 (Skopil, J., dissenting).
[*P83] We need not choose today between these opposing views; on this record, Martin loses either way. Martin had the burden to show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Fleetwood’s apartment. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, fn. 1; 6 LaFave at 204-205. Even assuming that a guest who is the subject of an arrest warrant may challenge the lack of a warrant to search his host’s residence, there was no evidence that Martin was a guest in Fleetwood’s apartment.
[*P84] Neither Martin nor Fleetwood testified at the suppression hearing; in fact, Martin submitted no evidence at all. His presence in the apartment was “totally unexplained,” United States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 650 (6th Cir.1986). Because Martin failed to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Fleetwood’s apartment, the trial court did not err in overruling Martin’s motion to suppress the murder weapon. We overrule Martin’s ninth proposition of law.