A dog sniff during a routine traffic stop was unreasonable because it extended the stop. Under state case law, the dog sniff had to have some relation to the purpose of the stop or reasonable suspicion developed, and here there was none. Lane v. Commonwealth, 2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 184 (Nov. 4, 2016):
Accordingly, if a dog sniff occurs during a traffic stop, it passes constitutional muster in one of three ways: it is related to the offense for which the person was stopped; it does not extend at all the time it takes to complete the traffic stop; or, it is premised on probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related activity. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253 (Ky. 2013).
In the instant case, Lane was stopped because he allegedly failed to yield at a stop sign. Running the drug dog around the vehicle was in no way related to the purpose for which Lane was stopped. Thus, the first prong fails.
The second prong also fails because running the drug dog prolonged the traffic stop for at least some period of time. Officer Merrick could have been attending to the “ordinary inquiries” — i.e., running Lane’s license and registration — or he could have been writing the traffic violation ticket during the time that he was having K9 Bowie sniff the vehicle. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1616, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (“If an officer can complete traffic-based inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of ‘time reasonably required to complete [the stop’s] mission.'”) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. 834). Indeed, the Commonwealth’s argument that “the sniff did not prolong the stop at all because it only took a few seconds[,]” Appellee’s Brf. at 7, demonstrates the de minimis principle was violated. It does not matter that the sniff took a few seconds or a few minutes — that the dog sniff prolonged the traffic stop any amount of time violated Lane’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, as the sniff was not related to the offense for which Lane was stopped, and it impermissibly prolonged the traffic stop, it was only permissible if there was probable cause or a reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related activity.
Here, we find there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related activity justifying the dog sniff. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Commonwealth argues reasonable articulable suspicion of drug-related activity existed because the officers testified that Lane might have been fumbling with drugs as they were approaching the vehicle. Furthermore, the officers were in a “high-crime neighborhood” and had a “hunch” or bad feeling about Lane.