A Phoenix officer was shot and killed on duty. “More than 300 public safety personnel, the chief of police, and the mayor quickly converged on the scene. Roughly 100 people entered the area where Sergeant Drenth’s body was discovered, including the three plaintiffs, who were assigned to canine search teams.” Male DNA was found at the scene. All but five voluntarily contributed DNA to exclude them. The five weren’t suspects, but they needed to be excluded. They steadfastly refused to provide DNA, so the PPD applied for a court order to get it. After it was obtained they sued for nominal damages, a declaratory judgment, and to have it destroyed. A court order, a warrant, to obtain evidence does not require that the person from whom it is obtained be a suspect in a crime. DNA can be collected by court order to exclude people from an investigation. Bill v. Wheeler, 13-15844 (9th Cir. August 31, 2015):
To be sure, the orders here did not seek to obtain evidence that the plaintiffs committed a crime. But contrary to plaintiffs’ intimations, “[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property,” or in this case the person, to be searched “is suspected of crime.” Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). Rather, “probable cause to search … concerns the connection of the items sought with crime and the present location of the items.” United States v. O’Connor, 658 F.2d 688, 693 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981). Of course, law enforcement must demonstrate “a nexus … between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.” Warden, Md. Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). “[I]n the case of ‘mere evidence,’ probable cause” for such a nexus “must be examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction.” Id.
These constitutional requirements were satisfied here. The superior court expressly found “probable cause to believe that the crime of Homicide had been committed.” Plaintiffs wisely do not challenge this finding; indeed, the affidavits detailed the date, time, victim, and crime scene of the highly publicized death being investigated. The affidavits also explained that DNA samples were sought from all public safety personnel who entered the crime scene to exclude them as depositors of the questioned DNA. It cannot be meaningfully debated that there was probable cause to believe the evidence sought could be found in the place to be searched (inside of plaintiffs’ mouths). See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (explaining that probable cause is a “commonsense, practical question”).
Moreover, the affidavits plainly demonstrated “a nexus” between the crime under investigation and the evidence sought. Warden, 387 U.S. at 307. They stated that “[a]pproximately 50 Phoenix Police Officers entered the scene,” along with numerous other public safety personnel; that all of these public safety personnel except for plaintiffs and two other Phoenix police officers (identified by name and badge number) had already provided samples; and that such samples would be “analyzed for DNA and compared to other evidence in th[e] investigation” “[i]n attempts to identify the unknown DNA profile/s” found at the scene, and thus “may contribute to the identification of the individual who committed the felony offense described.”
That plaintiffs had themselves already been excluded as suspects does not undermine the nexus between the evidence desired and the crime investigated; excluding public safety personnel as the source of DNA would plainly “aid in” the conviction of an eventual criminal defendant, by negating any contention at trial that police had contaminated the relevant evidence. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1248 n.7 (2012) (emphasis and citation omitted); see also In re Morgenthau, 457 A.2d 472, 473-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (per curiam) (affirming order compelling collection of “blood and hair samples and finger and palm prints” from individuals who were “not suspects” in a homicide investigation because these “physical exemplars constituted material evidence relevant to [the suspect’s] guilt” and the orders, while not denominated as warrants, “comport[ed] with all the requisites of a search warrant”). We therefore conclude that the superior court orders authorizing the collection of plaintiffs’ DNA satisfied the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Given that conclusion, we need not address whether an exception to the warrant requirement would have applied in the absence of the orders.
If the killer is identified and charged, it also has the salutary effect of removing a defense argument that DNA at the scene wasn’t tested and could belong to another person who could have been the actual killer.
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by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)