Daily Archives: March 29, 2020

CO: Cell phone SW is particular if it gives just the phone number and expected owner’s name

A cell phone search warrant is sufficiently particular by identifying merely the phone number and the expected owner of the phone. People v. Pettigrew, 2020 COA 46, 2020 Colo. App. LEXIS 656 (Mar. 26, 2020). Defense counsel didn’t fail to … Continue reading

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N.D.Ind.: Having def sit in the patrol car didn’t prolong the stop

“[T]he officer did not commit an unlawful seizure when he instructed Salazar-Lopez to sit in the patrol car. The move to the patrol car did not impermissibly prolong the traffic stop, and was incidental to the mission of the stop.” … Continue reading

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W.D.Ky.: Not unreasonable under 4A that state “track and trace” warrant was served by fax in another jurisdiction; at least GFE applies

A state district court judge of apparent limited jurisdiction, not general criminal jurisdiction, had apparent authority to approve a “track and trace” order, or at least subject to the good faith exception. Suppression here would prove nothing at all. As … Continue reading

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OH9: Motion for returned property may still be appropriate after conviction

“[W]e find that a motion for the return of seized property may be a viable means to request the return of property even after conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Castagnola’s motion for the return of … Continue reading

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CA8: SW for already seized cell phone came from SW for far more; apparently created confusion, but not suppression

Officers had seized defendant’s phone and applied for a search warrant for it and other things at the same time, and that led to a motion to suppress the phone search. “Suellentrop argues that the search of the phone was … Continue reading

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N.D.Fla.: Unsupported habeas claim that SWs were forged inadequate

“Watson’s unsubstantiated ‘belief’ that the warrants were forged does not raise the specter of a constitutional violation, and she offers nothing else in support of this claim. Furthermore, her claim in Ground Three that counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he … Continue reading

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M.D.Fla.: Def had officer’s card and could have revoked consent to search cell phone by telephone call or letter

When officers took defendant’s phone by consent and one left his card, he could have revoked consent by calling and leaving word with his office or writing a letter. United States v. Butler, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51782 (M.D. Fla. … Continue reading

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W.D.Va.: Whistleblower CI has “strong[er] motive to supply accurate information.”

In a health care fraud case, a whistleblower confidential informant for a search warrant was entitled to more credit than a regular CI because of a likely “strong[er] motive to supply accurate information.” The search warrant for documents here was … Continue reading

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MT: State’s acting on nonbinding immigration detainer is an arrest subject to 4A and state law

An immigration detainer is not a demand to a state law enforcement officer to make a civil arrest, but, if a state law enforcement officer acts on it, it is a new arrest. It is ripe for judicial review because, … Continue reading

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